

# THE NAME DISPUTE

*/ PUBLIC VIEWS IN MACEDONIA / 2018*



MACEDONIAN CENTER FOR  
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION



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## FOREWORD

The Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) is a civil organisation dedicated to Macedonia's democratic development and to European policies and integration.

MCIC has continuously supported the right to self-identification of the Republic of Macedonia.

In 2004, together with other organisations, it organised and participated in the "Say Macedonia" (Don't you FYROM me) campaign. In 2008, with a joint statement "Both Macedonia and NATO", MCIC, together with several other organisations, again gave its opinion on the name as a right to self-identification rather than a dispute.

However, after not being invited to NATO membership in 2008, as well as after the European integration stand-still since 2009, the Macedonia name dispute has become the main obstacle in Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration.

In 2010 MCIC conducted the first public opinion research in Macedonia on the Macedonia name dispute. In 2011 and in 2013, MCIC and IDSC, led by the stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Macedonia and the need for policies based on facts conducted new public opinion researches on the Macedonia name dispute.

In April, 2018 MCIC and IDSCS, together with M-Prospect, conducted a public opinion research for the fourth time, and the results thereof are presented in this report.

The research should contribute towards a broader and more informed public debate on the name dispute which shall include all relevant stakeholders.

MCIC

IDSCS

# THE NAME DISPUTE - 2018

- Public views in Macedonia -

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

VMRO-DPMNE	VMRO - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
EC / EU	European Commission / European Union
DUI	Democratic Union for Integration
MCIC	Macedonian Center for International Cooperation
IDSCS	Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis - Skopje
PIP	Public and Informed Persons
UN	United Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Alliance
USA	United States of America
SDSM	Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
N/A	no answer
DK	don't know

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2018 Name Dispute – Public Views in Macedonia report shows the results of the public opinion survey conducted by MCIC and IDSCS for the fourth time, after the ones conducted in 2010, 2011, and 2013.

The research comprised of a public opinion survey. The public opinion survey was carried out as a field survey in the period from April, 5 to April, 20, 2018 on a representative sample of 1,004 respondents. The survey was implemented by M-Prospect, while researchers and authors of the research are Sasho Klekovski and Jasmina Mihailovska.

The report consists of introduction, including methodology, a brief history of the dispute, views of the citizens on resolving the dispute, national identity and other factors influencing the perceptions of the dispute, building a national position, expressing one's opinion through a referendum, and expectations for a solution to the dispute. In the end, the report ends with conclusions.

The view against any change of the name, after the increase in 2013, fell back to the 2010 level. One in two citizens (47.1%) are against any change of the name, which after the increase in 2013 (62.3%) reflects a return to the levels from 2010 (48.4) and 2011 (45.3%). Among ethnic Macedonians, the majority (59.6%) is for no change, which is a fall from 2013 (79.7%). The least acceptable solution is an "erga omnes solution" which is unacceptable for 40.8% of the citizens.

The gap between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in finding a solution is deepening. When it comes to the views on "keeping the name" as opposed to "Euro-Atlantic integration", 44.6% of ethnic Macedonians would opt to preserve the name (64.9% in 2013), whereas 90.1% of ethnic Albanians would opt for Euro-Atlantic integration (68% in 2013). In the views on resolving the dispute, what is the most acceptable for ethnic Macedonians, "no change" (59.6%), is the least acceptable for ethnic Albanians (40.8%), and vice versa - what is the most acceptable for ethnic Albanians, "erga omnes" (42.3%), is the least acceptable for ethnic Macedonians (50.6%). Such gap does not lead to an increase in the risk of deteriorating inter-ethnic relations (in case of not resolving the dispute), which risk perception amounts to 19.7% (23.7% in 2013 and 13.8 % in 2011).

A joined name (e.g. Gornamakedonija - Uppermacedonia) is unacceptable for a vast majority of the citizens (79.1%). Half of the citizens (44.9%), as well as the majority of ethnic Macedonians (55.1%), accept no geographic determinant. Of the proposed geographic determinants, the most acceptable ones are Upper and Skopje, as well as a geographic determinant as an addition to the name (24.4%).

The citizens find the non-exclusive use of the term Macedonia from both countries as acceptable (53.5%). A large majority of citizens oppose the change in codes, specifically the MK country code (71.7%) and the Internet code (69.2).

Government measures on building trust are somewhat unaccepted. The majority of citizens (51%), fully or somewhat, do not justify the renaming of the airport and the highway. A large majority of citizens (65.6%) find the removal of the "Warrior on a horse" statue unacceptable.

Apart from the citizens who would never want for an agreement to enter into force for they find the name change unacceptable, 35.6% of citizens believe that the most appropriate moment for the agreement to enter into force is when Macedonia will become an EU member state so that there is no new conditioning.

Identity remains to be the granite red line, which is also reflected in the position against any change of the name, but also in the opposing against completing the definition of the nationality/citizenship and the Macedonian language in the UN. The definition of Macedonian nationality/citizenship is accepted by 47.9% (59.1% ethnic Macedonians), certain variations such as Latin or double use are accepted by 25.3%, whereas the definition as a citizen of the Republic of Upper

Macedonia is accepted by 14.4% of the citizens (34.7% ethnic Albanians). The views are similar to these on the definition of the language.

Citizens believe that language (27.45%), the Constitution (23.5%) and citizenship (23.1%) are the most important so as to preserve the identity of the Macedonian people, and they perceive the Constitution and the constitutional name as the rampart for its defence. Almost half of the citizens (45.1%) believe that by changing the constitutional name, the identity will change, whereas 17.8% believe that the Macedonian identity will not change in any situation. A large majority of citizens (73.8%) think that a change in the constitutional name will impact the identity a lot or somewhat. Therefore, there is strong resistance to changing the Constitution, that is to say, 48.3% of the citizens and 60.7% of ethnic Macedonians are against any change in the Constitution, regardless of whether it is a question of name provisions or other questions. A change in the Constitution on defining the international name is acceptable for 18.3% of citizens.

The name, the identity, (stand-still) in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, fear of new demands from Greece and internal divisions are the main factors influencing the name dispute. For the first time since these researches have been conducted does Euro-Atlantic integration (49.7%) have priority as opposed to keeping the name (35%).

Citizens believe that we are far from reaching a broad agreement. A majority of the citizens (55.1%) think that there is no broad agreement, that is to say, national consensus. Furthermore, there is no clear perception as to what the position of the Government is in the spectrum from no change to erga omnes. Citizens perceive Gjorgje Ivanov, the President of the Republic and VMRO-DPMNE to be on the side of "keeping the name", whereas the Government and SDSM, as well as DUI and Besa, on the side of "Euro-Atlantic integration".

More citizens (41.7%) and ethnic Macedonians (49.6%) would not vote in the next elections for the party that will resolve the name dispute, as opposed to 36% who would vote for.

Citizens want a referendum prior to the agreement; the outcome depends on the EU. The expectations that citizens be given the opportunity to express their opinion through a referendum are on a continuous rise, amounting to 71.4% in 2018, and starting from 54.4% in 2010, to 64% in 2011 and 66.3% in 2013. It seems that EU membership is a factor that could influence the outcome of the referendum. Whereas citizens would reject a change of the name, 50.2% being against and 41.5% for, the views change provided that the change of the name happens when the country becomes an EU member, in which case 45% opt against and 47.6% for a change. This is a change compared to 2013, and the vote against has decreased by approximately 10 percentage points (2013 - 62.7% against, 58.4% against in case of EU membership).

Strong wishes, lower expectations of a solution. While every second citizen (48%) desires a solution within one year, such expectations are held by every fourth citizen (26.3%). Expectations have increased compared to 2013, and there is a drop in the attitude that there will never be a solution found.

Window for solution: acceptance of identity by Greece, a solution in two stages and EU membership. The relation between "keeping the name" and "Euro-Atlantic integration" can be under the influence of identity questions (the Constitution, language, nationality), as well as the fear of further demands imposed by Greece for new concessions, and internal divisions and conflicts. Defining language and nationality/ citizenship as Macedonian, as well as keeping the country code (MK) and the language can decrease the feeling of identity threat. It is similar with adding a geographic determinant as an addition after the name, e.g. Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).

Dealing with both threats, the one of new concessions and the one of internal divisions is a precondition for strengthening the support for an agreement. Postponing the change in the Constitution at the moment of entering the EU is exceedingly important for the fear of new demands from Greece. The second fear of internal divisions can be overcome by applying a "framework model", that is to say, the possible agreement with Greece to be approved in writing by all major political parties.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The 2018 Name Dispute – Public Views in Macedonia report shows the results of the public opinion survey conducted by MCIC and IDSCS for the fourth time. The previous three reports were published in 2010, 2011 and 2013. The reports, even though focusing on the name dispute, are based on issues current at given time intervals, so accordingly, the formulation of certain questions differs in 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2018.

The report consists of introduction, including methodology, a brief history of the dispute, views of the citizens on resolving the dispute, national identity and other factors influencing the perceptions of the dispute, building a national position, expressing one's opinion through a referendum, and expectations for a solution to the dispute, and ends with conclusions.

### 1.1. Methodology and approach

The public opinion survey was conducted by a field survey in households in the period from April, 5 to April, 20 2018 on a national representative sample of 1,004 respondents. The population frame of the sample was population older than 18 years of age, and the representativeness criteria were: gender, ethnicity, age, place of living and regions. A full overview of the sample is given in the annex. The public opinion survey, which is the basis for this report, was implemented by M-Prospect, whose responsibility was also the methodological functioning of the survey.

The sample structure is provided in the annex.

### 1.2. Terms and Definitions

The report uses terms, for example, on the possible solutions which are defined in Table 1. Overview of the formulations used for name solutions.

Macedonia or the Republic of Macedonia, meaning the name of the state is used for the state Republic of Macedonia.

Nationality is used in the sense of belonging to a state, citizenship, rather than ethnicity. When it comes to defining nationality at the UN, it is explained by citizenship. The conclusions also use national unification as unification of the nation/citizens.

### 1.3. Results Processing and Presentation

Data collected are processed by response frequency and proportion. Data have a 95% accuracy rate and are subject to error of  $\pm 3$  %. The results are shown in graphs at a total sample level. Apart from the graphs, the data are also shown in figures.

The report uses insignificant minority for responses that are less than 10% of the sample, small minority when there are 11% to 30%, minority for 30% to 50%, majority for 51% to 70% and big majority for over 70%.

The socio-demographic analyses for the smaller ethnic communities and political parties with fewer supporters are not commented in this report due to their small participation in the national sample.

In tables and graphs, the terms ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, etc., mark the ethnicity of respondents. The names of political parties stand for the citizens supporters of the respective political party.

During processing, the results for "don't know" and "no answer" are also taken into account. However, certain tables and graphs in the report do not include these results, and therefore the sum of all answers is not 100%. The reason for this is to simplify the presentation of the results.



### **1.4. Research Limitations**

The course of the talks under the auspices of the UN and the possible solutions are neither publicly communicated nor do MCIC and IDSCS or their researchers have any knowledge about them. Media is the only source. The report does not suggest that a solution has been found, appropriate and possible solution and/ or solution is used for a future or possible solution. All examples have been given hypothetically, as an illustration of possible solutions.

## **2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE**

### **2.1. Start of the Dispute and the Interim Accord**

The Macedonia name dispute became visible (current) after the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991, when Greece opposed the usage of the name Macedonia by the Republic of Macedonia, referring to historical and territorial reasons. Greece considered that it had the exclusive right to use the name for its province of Macedonia and its inhabitants.

Although Macedonia fulfilled the conditions for recognition of its independence (together with Slovenia) according to the Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia, Greece blocked the recognition by the European Union (EU), as well as its joining the United Nations (UN). On June 27, 1992, the EU (then EEC), under the influence of Greece, in the so called Lisbon Declaration, offered a recognition of the country “under a name that would not contain the word Macedonia”. Apart from this, Greece blocked the Macedonian-Greek border for any trade on two occasions in the period 1992-1995, in order to exercise pressure on the Republic of Macedonia. In December, 1992, the UN established a preventive security mission UNPROFOR in Macedonia, among other countries of the former Yugoslav federation, and in 1995 it was replaced by UNPREDEP; the mandate of the latter ended in 1999.

Greece expressed its concern that Articles 3 and 49 of the Constitution of Macedonia stimulate territorial aspirations. In order to decrease the concern of the possible territorial aspirations, on January 6, 1992, the Parliament of Macedonia adopted the Amendments I and II of the Constitution, which change and amend Articles 3 and 49. On April 7, 1993, the UN Security Council approved to accept Macedonia in the United Nations with its Resolution 817, with a recommendation that the temporary reference “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is used for the country for all purposes within the UN, until there is a resolution to the name differences. The General Assembly accepted Macedonia as the 181st member of the UN with its Resolution 225 on April 8, 1993. The temporary reference, which is a reflection of the past of Macedonia, starts with small letters, because it is not a name but a descriptive term and the reference is not an international name, but it is used only in the UN. To confirm this, Macedonia obtained its seat in the UN under the letter “t”, coming from “the former...”.

On June 18, 1993, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 845, which asks for acceleration of resolving the differences, and the Secretary General appointed Cyrus Vance as a special representative until 1995; since 1995, this function has been given to Matthew Nimetz.

On September 13, 1995, Greece and Macedonia signed an Interim Accord, in which both parties agree: Macedonia will guarantee that there are no territorial aspirations in the Preamble and in Articles 3 and 49 of its Constitution and it will change its national flag (with the Vergina sun), and Greece will not block the entry of Macedonia in international organisations, and the parties will continue the talks on the differences under the auspices of the UN.

From 1995 to 2008, the mediator Matthew Nimetz proposed a number of possible solutions which were unacceptable for one of the two parties.

### **2.2. Blocking NATO and EU Membership and the Verdict of the International Court of Justice**

On April 3, 2008, at the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO) Summit in Bucharest, Macedonia did not get a membership invitation, although supported by the USA, due to a veto imposed by Greece.

On November 17, 2008, Macedonia started a process before the International Court of Justice on violations of the Interim Accord obligations by Greece, i.e. on the blocking of the entry of Macedonia to NATO. The Court reached a verdict on December 5, 2011, saying that: opposing the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO in the period before the NATO Summit

held in Bucharest in 2008, Greece violated the Interim Accord from 1995; it is expected from Greece not to violate international law again (as per definition, its “good will” is assumed); Macedonia can further use its constitutional name in relations with Greece and within international organisations; and all statements of Greece that the Republic of Macedonia has violated the Interim Accord are rejected.

In 2009 Macedonia received a recommendation from EC on opening EU membership negotiations, but at the same time there was a request for “agreed and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential”. Until now, there has been no date set for opening negotiations for Macedonia.

Despite the verdict of the International Court of Justice on violation of the Interim Accord obligations by Greece, Macedonia’s NATO and EU membership is still blocked.

### **2.3. The Mediator’s Proposals in the period 2008-2013**

In the talks led under the UN auspices with mediation of Matthew Nimetz, various possible solutions have been discussed on several occasions, but without success. According to informal sources, the proposal from 2008 is for the Republic of Macedonia to remain the official name in the Constitution (in Macedonian language), whereas the name of the country in all international organisations (i.e. UN, EU, NATO) to be “Republic of Northern Macedonia”; the Security Council should propose that the name “Republic of Northern Macedonia” be used in inter-governmental official relations with third countries. The name “Macedonia” itself cannot be used by any of the two parties as an official name for the country or the province, both parties however can use the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” on a non-exclusive basis for unofficial purposes. Passports bear both names: Republic of Northern Macedonia in English and French, and Republic of Macedonia in Macedonian. This proposal can be interpreted as a proposal that tends towards a name for international use. It tends, because apart from international organisations, it should also be used in bilateral relations; however, even though the Security Council can recommend application in bilateral relations, every country has the sovereign right to decide under which name it shall establish diplomatic relations. In 2009/11, there have been efforts to approximate the views of the two countries around the name differences at a number of meetings of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Macedonia, Papandreu and Gruevski. In October, 2012 Greece offered a draft Memorandum of Understanding, which among other things offers a resolution of the name dispute by a determinant, as well as “erga omnes” use of such name: from all and for all purposes”. In spring, 2013, Matthew Nimetz proposed the “Upper Republic of Macedonia” for “the broadest use possible”. The proposal was not supported by Greece.

### **2.4. Situation and Positions before the Current Round of Talks**

Macedonia has been accepted under the temporary reference in all international organisations. More than 130 countries recognise Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia, including four out of the five permanent members of the UN (with the exception of France), and many countries do not use the temporary reference, while part of them have no position/ interest in this issue.

Therefore, the existing position is the temporary reference for international organisations (the temporary reference contains the word Macedonia and the determinant FYR), and more countries accept the name Republic of Macedonia in the inter-governmental official bilateral relations, while some use the temporary reference.

The position of Greece from “one name that will not contain the word Macedonia” for all usages has evolved into “one name that will contain the word Macedonia and a geographic determinant” for all usages. The “erga omnes” position, or a position for all usages is in two meanings for “all international usages”, including the passport, or “for all usages”, including internal usage. Greece has refused the proposal Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) for international usage on several occasions.

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<sup>1</sup> This is the example with Taiwan, which establishes diplomatic relations only under the name Republic of China.

The position of Macedonia on the dispute is a solution that will not change the Constitution of Macedonia in order to change the constitutional name and will not endanger the Macedonian national identity, the individuality of the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian language; the citizens (the majority) should agree with the possible solution in a referendum.

### **2.5. The Current Round of Talks**

In November 2015, the mediator Matthew Nimetz sparked optimism for a possible solution over the next 15 months, until 2017, since after a long-standing stand-still it seemed that the context in the international community, Greece and Macedonia were the most favourable for resolution of the name dispute. Nimetz's deadline was prolonged for a year, but most agree that in the first half of 2018 there is an exceptional "window of possibility" for dispute resolution, and freeing Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration.

Nimetz's latest proposal from the beginning of 2018 is in fact not a new proposal but a sum of all proposals so far, and is published in full by the Greek newspaper *To Vima*. The name proposal is Macedonia with several determinant variations Upper, North, Vardar, New and (Skopje), the country would be categorised under the letter M, and as an example the name Republic of Upper Macedonia is used. The name would be for external and internal use where it is related with the EU. The language and the nationality would be "makedonski" or the language of the Republic [determinant] Macedonia. The trade use of Macedonia and Macedonian would be non-exclusive. The dispute would be resolved in two stages related with the entry to NATO and EU. Nimetz's proposal balanced in this way meets some minimum demands of both sides. Greece demands a name with a determinant, for overall (international?) use and defining the language in original. Macedonia demands preservation of Republic of Macedonia for internal use (and partially for international?), listing under the letter M, use of the MK and MKD codes, and dispute resolution in two stages related with the entry to NATO and EU. Both sides can be satisfied with defining irreversible national procedures (this might also meet Macedonia's demand not to make an amendment to the Constitution to change the constitutional name). The proposals fit in the framework that if Greece deals with the Macedonian identity, as for example by accepting the Macedonian language, Macedonia would need to deliberate upon the possibilities between an international name and *erga omnes* - a name for internal use, whereby the latter is unacceptable for Macedonia.

Greece submitted a draft-agreement (i.e. a Memorandum of Good Neighbourhood), which would cover issues related with the name, irredentism, measures aimed at building trust, and international and regional integration. According to this draft, the name involves seven issues: the name, use, identity, language, trade use, acronyms and signs. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs reckons that the Constitution should be amended (the Preamble and two articles), and on the other hand, gives an *erga omnes* interpretation which involves change of passports and identity cards, and that the term Macedonian language is already in use. Macedonia sent out its own draft-agreement based on the double formula.

The Macedonian Government decided to rename the airport in Skopje and the E- 75 (A1/M1) highway. It seems that the possible compromise involves Macedonia accepting an international name which would change in the passport, on the position of the English name, after its entry to the EU, and Greece accepting the Macedonian language, as well as the abbreviations MK, MKD, etc. Nevertheless, accepting the abbreviations MK for the country and the language, as well as MKD and MAC for the language is something which has already been internationally accepted (ISO 3166 Country Codes, ISO 639 Language Codes). It seems that a central topic of discord becomes the Constitution and its amendment, which is Greece's demand, and is unacceptable for Macedonia.

### 3. SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE

In the part of solutions to the dispute, the views of the citizens on the elements of the solution have been researched: an acceptable name and scope of use; geographic determinant; naming the nation and the language; exclusivity, use of codes and abbreviations, measures aimed at building trust, as well as the time when the possible agreement would take effect.

#### 3.1. The Name - Solutions, Scope of Use and Acceptability of Determinants

When the views on the acceptable solution to the dispute have been surveyed, the citizens were asked to choose two most acceptable and one fully unacceptable solution out of the possible **five solutions**. The possible solutions refer to the **scope of use** of the compromise name and they move from one to another extreme position, i.e. from the position of Greece for “accepting a **new name** (with a geographic determinant) **for all usages**” to the position “Macedonia should accept **no change**”.

**Table 1 - Overview of descriptions used for name solutions**

Abbreviated description in the report	Description used in the questionnaire
1. New “erga omnes” name for all usages	The solution to the dispute is to accept a new name for all usages.
2. Agreed name for (overall) international use	The solution to the dispute is the use of an agreed name in all international communication, while the Republic of Macedonia would only be for internal use.
3. Agreed name for international organisations	The solution to the name dispute is the use of an agreed name in international organisations (UN, NATO, EU, etc.) while the other countries would name us upon their own choice and agreement.
4. “Double formula”	The solution to the dispute is the use of the name Republic of Macedonia in the internal and international communication, while Greece can use another name.
5. No change	Macedonia should accept no change.

“The double formula” or “Irish formula” according to Robin O’Neil is based on the solution between Ireland and Great Britain, according to which Ireland can call Great Britain differently than its official name. Between the “erga omnes” and “double formula” positions there are two more solutions, an agreed name for international organisations or for an overall international use. The agreed name for international organisations corresponds to the current position of the use of the temporary reference and this option would actually mean a change of the temporary reference by a permanent name. Of course, there are different variants of these two solutions possible. The double formula is usually, as in this report, exclusively related to a single solution. In a broader sense, besides no change and new name for all usages, all solutions are double formulas with different scopes – the Republic of Macedonia for internal use and the new name in a different scope for international use – only for Greece or for all.


Table 2 shows the views of the citizens on the first and second best and the least acceptable solution in (December) 2010, (September) 2011, (November) 2013 and (April) 2018.

**Table 2 - The first and second best, and the least acceptable solution, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2018 (in %).**

	First best				Second best				Least acceptable			
	2010	2011	2013	2018	2010	2011	2013	2018	2010	2011	2013	2018
Agreed name for international organisations	12.3	19.2	10.3	13.6	11.0	21.3	15.7	13.5	7.6	15.7	17.7	9.0
“Double formula”	25.0	20.8	8.0	14.4	31.9	30.7	27.5	19.4	7.4	9.7	9.7	10.4
No change	48.4	45.3	62.4	47.1	16.1	20.1	10.3	4.6	15.7	15.6	5.2	18.8
New “erga omnes” name for all usages	10.5	7.5	4.6	14.1	10.2	9.6	8.4	7.1	26.9	29.0	19.9	40.8
Agreed name for international use	2.9	5.1	5.5	10.1	3.7	7.8	7.4	11.9	25.2	20.8	19.7	12.9
I don’t know/ no answer	1.0	2.0	9.2	0.6	27.0	10.5	30.7	43.5	17.1	9.6	27.8	8.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>


A majority of the citizens (47.1%) is against any change in the name. The view “no change” has dropped since 2013, when it amounted to 62.4%.

**Graph 1 - The most acceptable solution to resolve the name dispute**




The view “no change” is on the same level as in the period 2010/ 2011.

**Graph 2 - The most acceptable solution to resolve the name dispute (2018, 2013, 2011 and 2010)**



The views of ethnic Albanians and Macedonians are on opposite sides, that is to say, for ethnic Macedonians (59.6%) the best solution is “no change”, while ethnic Albanians (42.3%) are for a new “erga omnes” name for all usages.

**Graph 3 - The most acceptable solution to resolve the name dispute according to ethnicity**



With ethnic Macedonians, the support to no change in the name has decreased from 79.7% in 2013 to 59.6%, with a considerable drop in the percentage among ethnic Albanians choosing this option compared to 2013 (from 23,4% to 6,6%). There is a visible increase among ethnic Albanians from 12.5% in 2013 to 42.3% in 2018 with regard to choosing the “erga omnes” option. (Table 3)

**Table 3 - The views on the solution of the dispute, according to ethnicity, 2018 (in %)**


View	First best		Second best		Least acceptable	
	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.
Agreed name for international organisations	15.6	8.5	13.9	15.5	8.6	11.7
“Double formula”	14.0	15.5	21.4	15.5	6.7	22.5
No change	59.6	6.6	3.9	7.0	11.3	40.8
New “erga omnes” name for all usages	4.7	42.3	3.1	20.7	50.6	7.0
Agreed name for international use	5.7	25.8	8.6	24.4	14.9	8.9
I don't know/ no answer	0.4	1.4	49.1	16.9	8.0	8.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table 4 shows the views of the most acceptable option among political party supporters. The majority of VMRO-DPMNE supporters (89.6%) have the position of “no change”, which is a small increase compared to 2013 (83.9%). An agreed name for international organisations is the most acceptable option for 28.5% of SDSM supporters, whereas the “Double formula” is acceptable for 23.1% of SDSM supporters. Almost one-fourth of SDSM supporters opt for “no change”. Among DUI supporters, the result analysis shows that the most selected option is the “erga omnes” one (45.3%), whereas for 28.8% the most acceptable solution is a name for international use.

**Table 4 - The most acceptable view with political party supporters, 2018 (%)**

Most acceptable view	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Agreed name for international organisations	1.9	28.5	9.6	<b>13.6</b>
“Double formula”	5.2	23.1	9.6	<b>14.4</b>
No change	89.6	24.8	6.8	<b>47.1</b>
New “erga omnes” name for all usages	2.4	12.4	45.2	<b>14.4</b>
Agreed name for international use	0.9	9.9	28.8	<b>10.1</b>
I don’t know/ no answer	0.0	1.2	0.0	<b>0.6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

On the other hand, the least acceptable view is a new “erga omnes” name for all usages, which is unacceptable for 40.8% of the citizens.

**Graph 4 - The least acceptable solution to resolve the name dispute**


The view against “erga omnes” is stronger than in all previous researches, as for example in 2013 it amounted to 19.9%, which is most probably because it is becoming clear that this is Greece’s main demand. “Erga omnes” is unacceptable for the majority of ethnic Macedonians (50.6%), whereas “no change” is unacceptable for 40.8% of ethnic Albanians.

### 3.2. The Constitution and its Possible Amendment

The Constitution of Macedonia and its amendment are becoming the main demand of Greece.

In order to arrive at a solution with Greece, citizens largely do not accept any change to the Constitution (48.3%), whereas 18.3% reckon that a change to the Constitution is acceptable in order to determine an international name.

**Graph 5 - Is a change to the Constitution acceptable in order to reach a solution**



Ethnic Macedonians (60.7%) and VMRO-DPMNE supporters (76.3%) believe more than the rest that there should be no change to the Constitution. The largest part of SDSM supporters share this view (34.7%), even though for them, unlike VMRO-DPMNE supporters, the change of the constitutional name and determining an international name is much more acceptable.

**Table 5 - The most acceptable view with political party supporters, 2018 (%)**

Most acceptable view	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
By changing the constitutional name	8.6	41.8	5.2	19.8	38.4
No change to the constitutional name, but determining an international name	15.1	29.6	7.1	26.9	26.0
By changing provisions not related with the name	12.1	21.1	10.4	13.2	27.4
No change to the Constitution is acceptable	60.7	5.2	76.3	34.7	6.8
I don't know/ no answer	3.4	2.3	0.9	5.4	1.4




### 3.3. Acceptability of Geographic Determinants

Citizens were asked about the acceptability of geographic determinants, and, more precisely, about the most frequently mentioned ones: Upper, Northern, New, Vardar and Skopje. The citizens were also asked about the position of the determinant in the possible name solution.

For somewhat less than half of the citizens (44.9%) none of the offered geographic determinants is acceptable. This view was selected by 70.3% in 2013.

The option Upper is acceptable for 17.1%, which is an increase in the acceptability of this option compared to 2013 (7.5%).

**Graph 6 - The most acceptable geographic determinant to reach a mutually acceptable solution**



There is a significant difference between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. Whereas 55.1% of ethnic Macedonians stated that “none is acceptable”, this is the view of 9.9% of ethnic Albanians. For ethnic Albanians, the most acceptable option is New (31.9%), whereas for ethnic Macedonians, after no change, the most acceptable one is the option Upper (15.3%). This option is acceptable for 31.8% of SDSM supporters. The majority of VMRO-DPMNE supporters (80.6%) accept no change.


**Table 6: The most acceptable geographic determinant for achieving a mutually acceptable solution based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>North</b>	7.0	9.9	2.8	12.8	5.5	<b>8.1</b>
<b>Upper</b>	15.3	24.9	4.3	31.8	26.0	<b>17.1</b>
<b>Vardar</b>	6.3	5.6	7.1	8.3	4.1	<b>5.9</b>
<b>New</b>	2.6	31.9	0.5	4.5	39.7	<b>9.5</b>
<b>Skopje</b>	11.1	16.9	4.3	21.5	9.6	<b>11.9</b>
<b>None is acceptable</b>	55.1	9.9	80.6	17.8	13.7	<b>44.9</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	2.6	0.9	0.5	3.3	1.4	<b>2.7</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

The views on the position of the geographic determinant in the possible mutually acceptable solution are given below, together with 70% of citizens for whom not a single variant is acceptable, corresponding to the views presented above on the acceptability of a geographic determinant.


For almost every fourth citizen (24.4%), the addition should be after the Republic of Macedonia, whereas for 17.2% the addition should be after the Republic, and before Macedonia.

**Graph 7 - The most acceptable variant to reach a mutually acceptable solution**



The acceptability of a joined name option was also measured, e.g. Gornamakedonija (Uppermacedonia). The majority responded that this is not an acceptable option (79.1%). Among ethnic Macedonians, the non-acceptance of a joined name is even greater (89.9%), whereas 52.1% of ethnic Albanians do accept such a change.

**Graph 8 - The acceptability of a joined name option (e.g. Gornamakedonija (Uppermacedonia)).**




### 3.4. Acceptability of (Additional) Defining the Nationality and Language

After researching the views on the scope and the use of a geographic determinant in the possible mutually acceptable solution, the views on defining the nationality and language were researched.

Graph 9 shows the view of the citizens on defining the nationality/ citizenship at the UN.

For 47.9%, the most acceptable is for the nationality/ citizenship to be Macedonian.

**Graph 9 - Acceptability of a nationality/ citizenship at the UN**




With this view there are differences between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, namely, for ethnic Macedonians it is acceptable for the nationality / citizenship to be Macedonian, whereas for ethnic Albanians the most acceptable options are Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia (34.7%) and Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia/ (Macedonian) (34.3%).

**Table 7 - Acceptability of nationality/ citizenship at the UN based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

%	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia</b>	7.3	34.7	1.9	15.7	32.9	<b>14.4</b>
<b>Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia / Macedonian</b>	7.1	34.3	0.5	16.5	35.6	<b>12.9</b>
<b>Makedonsko</b>	12.3	9.4	19.0	9.1	6.8	<b>12.4</b>
<b>Macedonian</b>	59.1	14.6	59.2	55.8	17.8	<b>47.9</b>
<b>Not a single one</b>	13.3	3.3	18.5	2.1	2.7	<b>10.9</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	0.9	3.8	0.9	0.8	4.1	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

Graph 10 shows the view of the citizens on accepting the language to be defined at the UN.

**Graph 10 - Acceptability of additionally defining the language at the UN**



It is visible that the most acceptable option is the definition Macedonian (45.7%), and the least acceptable definition is the Language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia / Macedonian (7.5%).

This option is the most acceptable for ethnic Macedonians (55.3%), whereas for a third of ethnic Albanians it is the most acceptable for the language to be defined as a Language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia.


**Table 8 - Acceptability of additionally defining the language at the UN based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**

	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia</b>	4.1	33.8	1.4	9.1	42.5	<b>11.4</b>
<b>Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia / Macedonian</b>	4.1	17.8	0.0	11.6	16.4	<b>7.5</b>
<b>Makedonski</b>	17.6	14.1	19.4	17.4	5.5	<b>16.5</b>
<b>Macedonian (Official language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia)</b>	7.4	14.6	1.9	12.8	8.2	<b>9.0</b>
<b>Macedonian</b>	55.3	13.6	61.6	47.5	20.5	<b>45.7</b>
<b>None</b>	10.0	3.3	14.2	0.8	2.7	<b>8.3</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	1.4	2.8	1.4	0.8	2.7	<b>1.7</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.5. Exclusivity of Use

According to the majority of the citizens, the term Macedonia should be used by both countries. However, one-third believe that only Macedonia has the right to this term.

**Graph 11 - Who should use the term Macedonia**



One-fourth of ethnic Albanians (26.8%) and one-fifth of DUI supporters (21.9%) believe that this term should not be used by any of the countries. 42.2% of VMRO-DPMNE supporters believe that only Macedonia is entitled to use this term.


**Table 9 - Acceptability of using the term Macedonia based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
To be used by both countries	59	34.7	51.7	67.4	37.0
Only Macedonia	34	31.9	42.2	27.3	27.4
Only Greece	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.4	1.4
Neither country	4	26.8	4.7	2.5	21.9
I don't know/ no answer	2.7	6.1	0.9	2.5	12.3

### 3.6. Use of Codes

Asked whether it is acceptable to change the MK country code, a large majority responded that this was unacceptable.

**Graph 12 - Acceptability of changing the MK country code**




The majority of ethnic Albanians (54.9%) say that this would not be an issue for them. Every third SDSM supporter also does not see the change in the MK code as an issue.

**Table 10 - Acceptability of changing the MK country code based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
Yes	15.4	54.9	5.7	35.5	65.8
No	80.7	43.7	93.4	60.7	30.1
I don't know/ no answer	3.9	1.4	0.9	3.7	4.1

There is a similar distribution of answers as per the question on acceptability of changing the MK Internet code of the country.

**Graph 13 - Acceptability of changing the MK Internet code of the country**




Changing the MK Internet code is acceptable for half of ethnic Albanians and for every third SDSM supporter.

### **3.7. Measures aimed at building trust**

Citizens were asked to what extent they justify renaming the airport and the highway in order to resolve the dispute, as well as the potential removal of the “Warrior on a horse” statue.

The majority of citizens do not justify the renaming of the airport and the highway (51%).

**Graph 14 - Justification for renaming the airport and the highway in order to reach a solution with Greece**



Seen through the lens of ethnicity, it is noticeable that this is much more justifiable for ethnic Albanians. Every fifth ethnic Macedonian believes that this is somewhat justified, and almost half think that it is not justified at all.


The majority of SDSM supporters justify this.

**Table 11 - Justification for renaming the airport and the highway based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
<b>Fully justified</b>	13.7	49.8	0.9	36.4	57.5
<b>Somewhat justified</b>	21.9	35.7	2.8	39.3	31.5
<b>Somewhat not justified</b>	13.6	11.3	9.5	11.2	9.6
<b>Not justified at all</b>	49	2.3	85.8	12.8	1.4
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	1.9	0.9	0.9	0.4	0.0

For more than one-fourth of the citizens (28.1%), it is acceptable to remove the Warrior on a Horse statue in Skopje in order to resolve the dispute with Greece.



**Graph 15 - Acceptability of removing the Warrior on a Horse statue in Skopje**

The majority of ethnic Macedonians (77.9%) do not agree with the removal of the Warrior on a Horse statue in Skopje. The opinion among SDSM supporters is divided - 43.8% think that it is acceptable, and 46.3% believe that it is not.

**Table 12 - Acceptability of removing the Warrior on a Horse statue in Skopje based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**


View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
Yes	15.3	69.0	0.9	43.8	79.5
No	77.9	27.7	97.6	46.3	19.2
I don't know/ no answer	6.9	3.3	1.4	9.9	1.4

### 3.8. Time of Possible Agreement Taking Effect

An additional element of the possible mutually acceptable solution is the time of its taking effect, whereby citizens were asked about their opinion between never, immediately and postponed to the moment of becoming an EU member. Views are presented in Graph 16.

For more than one-third of the citizens (37.8%), the agreement on the name should never enter into force. Still, more than one-third (35.6%) reckon that the agreement should enter into force after becoming an EU member.

**Graph 16 - Most appropriate moment for the mutually accepted solution to take effect**



The answers to this question differ if viewed from ethnic perspective. For the majority of ethnic Albanians, the agreement should take effect right after the agreement is made.

**Table 13 - Most appropriate moment for the mutually accepted solution to take effect based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Never, no change of the name is acceptable to me</b>	47.7	3.8	2.8	31.0	56.2	<b>37.8</b>
<b>Immediately after the agreement, independently from the NATO and EU integration</b>	13.3	54.0	22.7	49.6	39.7	<b>22.8</b>
<b>Postponed to the moment we become an EU member, so that there are no new conditions</b>	34.9	39.4	73.0	14.5	2.7	<b>35.6</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	4.1	2.8	1.4	5.0	1.4	<b>3.8</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

## 4. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DISPUTE


Citizens were asked about the factors influencing their perceptions of the dispute, such as keeping national identity, importance of Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as the main threats/ risks if there is a solution and if there is no solution to the dispute.

### 4.1. National identity

Citizens were asked what is the most important in order to preserve the identity of the Macedonian people, apart from the name of the country.

For citizens, language is the most important factor in keeping national identity (27.4%), then the Constitution (23.5%) and the citizenship (23.1%).

**Graph 17 - What is the most important for the preservation of the identity of the Macedonian people**




**Table 14 - Most important for the preservation of the identity of the Macedonian people based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
<b>The flag</b>	4.9	16.7	4.3	6.9	8.1
<b>The language</b>	29.7	21.8	27.3	30.7	13.2
<b>Citizenship</b>	24.4	19.0	26.3	26.0	29.4
<b>The Constitution</b>	24.6	18.5	28.0	20.6	25.0
<b>The history</b>	12.3	12.1	11.4	10.5	16.2
<b>Myths, stories and tradition</b>	1.3	4.1	1.0	2.6	1.5
<b>The food</b>	0.4	2.3	0.0	0.2	0.7
<b>Folklore</b>	1.0	2.1	1.0	1.1	2.2
<b>Other</b>	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.0
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	0.7	2.8	0.2	1.1	3.7

Almost half of the citizens (45.1%) believe that Macedonian identity will change if the constitutional name is changed. For 17.8%, Macedonian identity will not change in any situation.

**Graph 18 - In what situation will the Macedonian identity change**



VMRO-DPMNE supporters believe more than SDSM supporters that identity will change in all situations (30.8% opposed to 8.3%), and vice versa, SDSM supporters believe more than VMRO-DPMNE that Macedonian identity will not change in any situation (35.1% opposed to 7.1%).

**Table 15 - In what situation will the Macedonian identity change based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
<b>If the constitutional name is changed</b>	45.6	43.2	53.6	36.4	31.5
<b>If the name for international use is changed</b>	5.1	18.3	2.8	10.3	23.3
<b>If the FYROM reference is changed</b>	1.1	11.7	1.4	2.9	17.8
<b>In all situations</b>	19.7	6.1	30.8	8.3	9.6
<b>Macedonian identity will not change in any situation.</b>	19.4	16	7.1	35.1	12.3
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	9.0	4.7	4.3	7.0	5.5

A large majority of citizens (73.8%) think that a change in the constitutional name of RM will impact the identity Macedonians, Macedonian and Macedonian language.

A majority of ethnic Macedonians (57.9%) think that a change in the constitutional name of RM will impact the identity a lot, opposed to 35.7% of ethnic Albanians who share this opinion. VMRO-DPMNE supporters believe to a greater extent that the change will impact the identity compared with SDSM supporters (97.2% opposed to 52.4%).

**Table 16 - If the constitutional name is changed, to what extent will that impact the identity Macedonians, Macedonian and Macedonian language based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**


View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Will impact a lot	57.9	35.7	87.2	26.0	39.7	53.3
Will impact somewhat	18.0	29.6	10.0	26.4	26.0	20.5
Will somewhat not impact	11.1	19.2	1.9	21.9	19.2	12.7
Will not impact at all	10.9	13.1	0.5	23.6	12.3	11.0
I don't know/ no answer	2.1	2.3	0.5	2.1	2.7	2.5

#### 4.2. Importance of Euro-Atlantic Integration

Citizens were asked about their view in case of equal importance of Macedonia (the name) and Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU) - what was more important to them: “keeping the name even by paying the price of that leading to a stand-still of Euro-Atlantic integration and decreasing economic growth” or “Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU), in order to secure a perspective for the country, even if a compromise with Greece needs to be accepted which does not endanger Macedonian identity, culture and language”.

Citizens believe that Euro-Atlantic integration is more important than keeping the name (49.7%). 35.0% are for keeping the name, which is a decrease compared to 2013, when such a view was held by 49.9%.

**Graph 19 - NATO/ EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia in 2018, 2013 and 2011**



There are both ethnic and political party differences on this question. 44.6% of ethnic Macedonians opt for keeping the name, and 90.1% of ethnic Albanians opt for EU and NATO. Among SDSM supporters, the selection of EU and NATO has increased to 76.9% from 33.8% in 2013.

**Table 17 - NATO/ EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
EU and NATO are more important even if the price is a compromise	38.1	90.1	10.4	76.9	94.5	<b>49.7</b>
Keeping the name even if the price is stand-still in Euro-Atlantic integration	44.6	3.8	66.4	18.6	2.7	<b>35.0</b>
I do not agree with any of the listed statements	15.9	5.6	22.3	3.3	2.7	<b>14.1</b>
I don't know/ no answer	1.4	0.5	0.9	1.2	0.0	<b>1.2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

A large majority (88.9%) of the citizens, who have declared that keeping the name was more important to them, have opted for no change on the question for a solution. Among citizens who have declared for Euro-Atlantic integration, the view for a new name for all usages (25.3%) is the most represented, and the second most represented view for a solution for the name is “an agreed name for international organisations” (23.6%).


**Table 18 - Crossing views on NATO/ EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia with the most acceptable solution (%)**

Views	Keeping the name even if the price is stand-still	EU and NATO are more important even if the price is a compromise	I do not agree with anything	I don't know/ N/A	Total
Agreed name for international organisations	3.4	23.6	2.8	25.0	<b>13.6</b>
“Double formula”	5.4	22.2	9.2	16.7	<b>14.4</b>
No change	88.9	11.4	71.1	25.0	<b>47.1</b>
New name for all usages	1.4	25.3	7.0	8.3	<b>14.1</b>
Agreed name for international use	0.9	17.0	8.5	8.3	<b>10.1</b>
I don't know/ N/A	0.0	0.4	1.4	16.7	<b>0.6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35.0</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>14.1</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 4.3. Main Threats/ Risks

Citizens find the non-acceptance by Greece of the reality that Macedonia, Macedonians and the Macedonian language exist as the main reason for the failure to resolve the dispute, which is a view of 53.8% of citizens. Second reason for the citizens is the lack of interest to resolve the dispute among the great powers (20.2%), and the third reason for the failure to resolve the dispute for the citizens lies in the (Macedonian) nationalism and stealing ancient history by Macedonia (10.3%).

Main threats for citizens, unless the dispute is resolved, are presented in graph 20.

**Graph 20 - Main threats/ risks if the dispute is not resolved**

The greatest risk for citizens is a stand-still in Euro-Atlantic integration, which is perceived as a risk by 29.3% of citizens, which is a drop from 32.3% in 2013. In addition, the perception of risk to the economic growth marks a drop to 23.1% from 26.1% in 2013.

The views on the risks unless the dispute is resolved are compared as per ethnicity and political party affiliation.


**Table 19 - Main threats/ risks if the dispute is not resolved based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Stand-still in Euro-Atlantic integration (EU, NATO)</b>	27.1	35.4	20.8	32.3	40.8	<b>29.3</b>
<b>Economic stand-still</b>	22.1	25.1	16.4	29.1	16.2	<b>23.1</b>
<b>Deterioration of inter-ethnic relations</b>	16.4	28.7	17.1	18.7	30.3	<b>19.7</b>
<b>Deterioration of security</b>	15.1	9.3	15.4	14.1	12.0	<b>13.2</b>
<b>Nothing will happen</b>	16.2	1.0	26.2	4.6	0.7	<b>12.0</b>
<b>Other</b>	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	<b>0.6</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	2.6	0.5	3.7	0.7	0.0	<b>2.1</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

Graph 21 presents the main threats if the dispute is resolved with an agreement with Greece. The greatest threat for citizens in case of an agreement with Greece is new concessions in terms of the identity which will be demanded by Greece (34.2%), which is comparable with the result from 2013 (32.9%).





**Graph 21 - What is probable to happen after resolving the dispute with Greece**

The fear that there will be conflicts inside Macedonia has risen from 20% in 2013 to 33.9%. The perception of threat that the EU will not accept us due to a decreased enlargement interest marks a continuous rise since 2011 - 17.2% in 2018, 12.8% in 2013 and 6.8% in 2011.

Ethnic Albanians see a possibility for internal conflicts unless an agreement is reached with Greece much more - 46.3% compared with 30.9% of ethnic Macedonians.

**Table 20 - What will happen after the dispute with Greece is resolved based on ethnicity and political party affiliation**


View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Greece will have additional demands of Macedonia	35.5	29.4	41.5	25.6	35.2	<b>34.2</b>
The agreement will cause conflicts inside Macedonia	30.9	46.3	28.8	36.4	45.8	<b>33.9</b>
Regardless of the agreement, the EU is not ready for enlargement	16.8	17.2	19.5	13.4	19.2	<b>17.2</b>
Nothing will happen	11.0	5.3	46.5	32.5	20.4	<b>10.0</b>
Other	1.3	0.6	0.3	3.8	0.0	<b>1.1</b>
I don't know/ no answer	4.5	1.3	2.8	4.8	0.0	<b>3.6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5. BUILDING A NATIONAL POSITION

Citizens were asked about their perception if there is a national consensus, what the position of the Government is, how they assess the positions of the President, the Government and main political parties, as well as how the solution to the dispute would impact their voting decision.

Citizens reckon that there is no consensus, that is to say, 39.7% believe that there is consensus, as opposed to 55.1% who think that there is none.

**Graph 22 - Existence of a broad agreement - a consensus between relevant political parties on the name dispute**




More than half of ethnic Albanians (54.5%) think that there is consensus as opposed to 36.7% of ethnic Macedonians. SDSM supporters believe that there is consensus more than VMRO-DPMNE supporters.

**Table 21 - Existence of a broad agreement - a consensus between relevant political parties on the name dispute based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Ethnic Macedonia	Ethnic Albanian	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Full consensus	11.1	15.0	4.7	19.0	15.1	<b>11.3</b>
Certain consensus	25.6	39.4	17.5	38.4	32.9	<b>28.5</b>
Partially there is no consensus	27.6	29.6	28.9	24.4	34.2	<b>27.9</b>
There is no consensus at all	30.1	13.6	42.7	14.0	15.1	<b>27.2</b>
I don't know/ N/A	5.6	2.3	6.2	4.1	2.7	<b>5.2</b>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

The citizens had the opportunity to share their perception of the position of the Government of RM regarding this question. The distribution of answers shows that more than one-fourth of the citizens believe that the Government is for the “erga omnes” option (26%). The percentage of those who think that the position of the Government is an Agreed name for overall international use is close with those who believe that the Government makes efforts for reaching a Double formula (16.8% as opposed to 15.1%).

**Graph 23 - Position of the Government of RM**

VMRO-DPMNE supporters think to a largest part that the position of the Government is the "erga omnes" option (21.8%), while the percentage of those who think that the Government makes efforts for the "Double formula" option is close (20.4%).

SDSM supporters, on the other hand, think to a largest part that the Government strives for an agreed name for international organisations (23.1%). Similarly, 21.5% of SDSM supporters believe that the Government strives for a "Double formula" and 20.7% think that the position of the Government involves a change for all usages "erga omnes". (Table 22)

**Table 22 - Views on the position of the Government of RM among political party supporters, 2018 (%)**

Most acceptable view	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Agreed name for international organisations	10.0	23.1	8.2	<b>26.0</b>
"Double formula"	20.4	21.5	15.1	<b>16.8</b>
No change	18.5	6.6	12.3	<b>15.1</b>
New "erga omnes" name for all usages	21.8	20.7	30.1	<b>13.6</b>
Agreed name for international use	18.0	17.8	21.9	<b>13.0</b>
I don't know/ no answer	11.4	10.3	12.3	<b>15.3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Furthermore, respondents were asked to rank political parties and a part of the politicians on a scale, whereby the one end of the scale is held by the view that the name cannot be changed in any way, even if the price to pay is the Euro-Atlantic integration (-5), while the other end is held by the position that Euro-Atlantic integration is the most important, even if it is necessary to change the name (+5). Table 23 shows the average rankings on each of them.

**Table 23 - Position on a scale “The name cannot be changed in any way, even if the price to pay is the Euro-Atlantic integration (-5), Euro-Atlantic integration is the most important, even if it is necessary to change the name (+5).”**

Politician/ Institution	Average ranking
President Ivanov	-3.36
The ruling political party, SDSM	3.35
The political party in opposition, VMRO-DPMNE	-2.86
Political party DUI	3.42
Political party BESA	2.90
Government of RM	3.05


The success of managing the name dispute was also assessed, more specifically for the Prime Minister, the Government, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrov, on a scale from 1 to 5. Table 24 shows the average rankings on this question.

**Table 24 - How successful do the following politicians manage the name dispute on a scale from 1 to 5**

Politician/ Institution	Average ranking
Prime Minister Zaev	3.01
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitrov	3.01
Government of RM	2.94

If the name dispute with Greece is resolved, 36% of the citizens will vote at the next elections for the party that has resolved the dispute.

**Graph 24 - At the next elections I will vote for the party which resolved the dispute**



Almost half of ethnic Macedonians (49.6%) would not vote for the party which will resolve the name dispute with Greece. Two-thirds of ethnic Albanians and of SDSM supporters would vote for that party.

**Table 25 - At the next elections I will vote for the party which resolved the dispute based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**


View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI
Yes	27.4	64.3	6.6	65.3	60.3
No	49.6	19.7	80.6	16.5	21.9
I don't know/ no answer	23	16	12.8	18.2	17.8

## 6. REFERENDUM

According to the statements of several key political stakeholders in Macedonia, the name solution will need to be supported by citizens in a referendum.

Graph 25 shows the views of citizens on supporting a referendum. 71.4 % of citizens are for a referendum and support is on the rise; it amounted to 66.3% in 2013, 64% in 2011 and 54.4% in 2010.

**Graph 25 - Is it necessary for citizens to express their opinion through a referendum for the possible solution to the name dispute**




The referendum is generally supported by all socio-demographic groups. Support for referendum vote has increased among ethnic Macedonians and VMRO-DPMNE supporters.

**Table 26 - Support for referendum vote for the name based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (in %)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Yes</b>	79.3	46.5	85.8	69.4	58.9	<b>71.4</b>
<b>No</b>	17.6	49.8	13.3	26.9	35.6	<b>25.2</b>
<b>I don't know/ no</b>	3.1	3.8	0.9	3.7	5.5	<b>3.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

Graph 26 shows the views how citizens would decide in a referendum.

**Graph 26 - How would you vote in a referendum asking the following question “Do you agree with the change of the name of the Republic of Macedonia?”**



The majority of the citizens (50.2%) would vote “no” in a referendum for Republic of Upper Macedonia. This is a drop compared to 2013 when 62.7% would vote “no” for Republic of Upper Macedonia.

The majority of ethnic Macedonians (62%) would vote “no”, as well as VMRO-DPMNE supporters. Compared with 2013, we observe an increase among ethnic Macedonians in accepting a change (28.3% in 2018 as opposed to 5.4% in 2013). “Yes” would be the decision of 85.0% of ethnic Albanians, significantly more than in 2011 (48.8 %).

The majority of SDSM supporters (63.6%) would agree to a change in a referendum. A large majority of DUI (86.3%) would also answer “yes”.

**Table 27 - Agreement (in a referendum) with changing the name into Republic of Upper Macedonia, based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Yes</b>	28.3	85.0	6.6	63.6	86.3	<b>41.5</b>
<b>No</b>	62.0	12.2	88.2	27.7	13.7	<b>50.2</b>
<b>I won't vote</b>	4.4	1.4	4.3	2.9	0.0	<b>3.8</b>
<b>I don't know/ no</b>	5.3	1.4	0.9	5.8	0.0	<b>4.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>


A large majority of citizens who find the change of the name unacceptable (no change) would vote against in a referendum to change the name.

**Table 28 - Crossing views: voting in a referendum with the most acceptable solution**

View	Agreed name for international organisations	“Double formula”	No change	New name for all usages	Agreed name for international use	DK/ N/A	Total
Yes	67.9	61.4	5.7	90.8	77.2	16.7	41.5
No	15.3	29.7	87.5	7.7	13.9	16.7	50.2
I won't vote	2.2	2.8	5.7	0.0	2.0	33.3	3.8
I don't know/ N/A	14.6	6.2	1.1	1.4	6.9	33.3	4.5
<b>Total</b>	13.6	14.4	47.1	14.1	10.1	0.6	100.0

In order to assess the possible influence of EU membership, a question was asked on deciding in a referendum to a name agreement related with EU membership, which is presented in graph 8.

Almost half of the citizens (47.6%) agree with a change of the name in Republic of Upper Macedonia when the country becomes an EU member.

**Graph 27 - Agreement (in a referendum) with changing the name in Republic of Upper Macedonia when the country becomes an EU member**


More than one-third of ethnic Macedonians (35.7%) agree with a change in the name when the country becomes an EU member. There is a big difference in the response to this question between VMRO-DPMNE supporters (10% would accept such a change) and SDSM supporters (72.3% would accept a change).

**Table 29 - Agreement (in a referendum) with changing the name into Republic of Upper Macedonia, when the country becomes an EU member based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Yes	35.7	87.8	10.0	72.3	86.3	<b>47.6</b>
No	56.0	8.5	84.8	23.6	9.6	<b>45.0</b>
I won't vote	4.6	0.5	3.8	1.7	0.0	<b>3.7</b>
I don't know/ no answer	3.7	3.3	1.4	2.5	4.1	<b>3.7</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

An additional question was asked about agreement in a referendum to change the FYROM reference into Republic of Upper Macedonia. The distribution of answers shows that 43.6% would agree with this.

**Graph 28 - Agreement (in a referendum) with changing the FYROM reference into Republic of Upper Macedonia**




**Table 30 - Agreement (in a referendum) with changing the FYROM reference into Republic of Upper Macedonia, based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Yes	30.6	86.9	10.9	66.5	87.7	43.6
No	59.1	8.0	83.4	25.2	8.2	47.2
I won't vote	5.6	2.8	4.7	2.9	2.7	4.8
I don't know/ no	4.7	2.3	0.9	5.4	1.4	4.4
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Graph 29 shows the possible reactions of citizens to a potential agreement supported by big political parties and the organisation of a referendum.

**Graph 29 - Participation in referendum party activities**





The largest part of citizens (29.2%) would join campaigns and gatherings in support of and voting FOR the agreement.

Ethnic Albanians more than ethnic Macedonians would join campaigns and gatherings in support of and voting FOR the agreement (54.5% opposed to 22.6%). An insignificant minority of VMRO-DPMNE supporters (8.1%) would join in FOR support of the agreement.

**Table 31 - Participation in referendum party activities based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>I would join campaigns and gatherings in support of and voting FOR the agreement</b>	22.6	54.5	8.1	50.4	46.6	<b>29.2</b>
<b>None of the offered</b>	24.3	23.9	34.3	26.8	20.4	<b>25.2</b>
<b>Depends on the final solution</b>	23.6	16.0	22.3	14.5	17.8	<b>22.3</b>
<b>I would join campaigns and gatherings on supporting and voting AGAINST the agreement</b>	27.6	2.3	17.5	24.0	31.5	<b>20.9</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	2.0	3.3	1.9	2.9	1.4	<b>2.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

## 7. EXPECTATIONS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE


Citizens were asked about their personal wish for a solution versus expectations when a solution will be reached, about the honesty of the parties to the dispute and about the involvement of the international community.

Graph 30 shows the responses of citizens on the time-frame within which they wish for the dispute to be resolved, that is to say, what they think when the dispute will be resolved.

Almost half of the citizens (48%) want a resolution of the dispute within 1 year, which is a decrease compared with 2013 (54.6 %). Almost one-third of the citizens (32.8%) want a resolution at any time, only in case of a reasonable agreement.

On the other hand, expectations that a resolution will happen within one year have significantly increased from 9.6% in 2013 to 26.3% in 2018. The number of those who believe that the dispute will never be resolved has decreased (17.3% in 2018 opposed to 29.4% in 2013).

**Graph 30 - Personal wish and expectations on solution to the name dispute (%)**



Stronger optimism on dispute resolution is shown by ethnic Albanians than by ethnic Macedonians, as well as by SDSM and DUI voters.


**Table 32 - Expectations on solution to the name dispute based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>In one year</b>	24.6	38.0	19.9	43.0	39.7	<b>26.3</b>
<b>In two to five years</b>	22.9	25.8	16.1	29.8	31.5	<b>23.1</b>
<b>In six to 10 years</b>	7.1	18.3	9.0	6.6	8.2	<b>10.1</b>
<b>More than 10 years</b>	9.3	8.9	16.6	3.7	11.0	<b>9.9</b>
<b>Never</b>	21.6	4.7	27.5	6.6	8.2	<b>17.3</b>
<b>I don't know/ N/A</b>	14.6	4.2	10.9	10.3	1.4	<b>13.3</b>
<b>Total</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	<b>100.0</b>

Graph 31 shows the views on the honesty of the parties to find a solution.

It may be observed that one-third (33.3%) reckon that both countries make efforts equally. Such perception has changed since 2013, when a minority held this view (13.8%).

**Graph 31 - Faith in the honesty of the parties to find a solution**




The majority of VMRO-DPMNE supporters (40.8%) think that only the Macedonian side is honestly devoted to finding a solution. The majority of ethnic Albanians believe that both countries are equally failing to make efforts. 6.5% of the citizens think that only the Greek side is honestly trying to find a solution.

**Table 33 - Faith in the honesty of the parties to find a solution**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
Both countries are honestly making efforts	34.0	33.3	16.6	61.2	46.6	<b>33.3</b>
Only the Macedonian side is making efforts	32.6	9.3	40.8	19.0	5.5	<b>26.8</b>
Only the Greek side is making efforts	4.1	11.7	5.7	3.3	9.6	<b>6.5</b>
Both countries are equally not making efforts	20.3	43.7	28.4	14.0	37.0	<b>26.2</b>
I don't know/ no answer	9.0	1.9	8.5	2.5	1.4	<b>7.3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Almost two-thirds (62.9%) of the citizens reckon that there is interest among the great powers to resolve the name dispute with Greece.

**Graph 132 - Is there any interest to resolve the name dispute with Greece among the great powers**




Ethnic Macedonians and VMRO-DPMNE supporters see lower interest unlike ethnic Albanians, and SDSM and DUI supporters.

**Table 34 - Is there any interest to resolve the name dispute among the great powers based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>Yes</b>	58.0	79.8	46.9	82.2	78.1	<b>62.9</b>
<b>No</b>	32.0	15.5	42.2	13.2	17.8	<b>27.8</b>
<b>I don't know/ no answer</b>	10.0	4.7	10.9	4.5	4.1	<b>9.3</b>

Citizens consider the USA (23.2%) and the EU (22.5%) as a third party that can contribute the most to resolving the dispute.

**Graph 33 - Third party (country or international organisation), which can contribute the most to resolving the dispute**



**Table 35 - Third party (country or international organisation), which can contribute the most to resolving the dispute based on ethnicity and political party affiliation (%)**

View	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	Total
<b>USA</b>	23.0	27.7	18.0	31.8	32.9	<b>23.2</b>
<b>EU</b>	21.1	23.9	16.1	33.5	13.7	<b>22.5</b>
<b>UN</b>	11.6	33.3	9.5	14.0	35.6	<b>16.6</b>
<b>Germany</b>	6.7	8.5	4.7	7.0	8.2	<b>7.2</b>
<b>Russia</b>	8.9	0.5	13.7	2.5	0.0	<b>6.6</b>
<b>Other</b>	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.2	2.7	<b>1.4</b>
<b>None</b>	20.9	3.8	31.3	6.6	6.8	<b>17.0</b>

## CONCLUSIONS

**The view against any change of the name, after the increase in 2013 to the 2010 level, “erga omnes” is the least acceptable solution**

One in two citizens (47.1%) are against any change of the name, which after the increase in 2013 (62.3%) reflects a return to the levels in 2010 (48.4) and 2011 (45.3%). Among ethnic Macedonians, the majority (59.6%) is for no change, which is a fall from 2013 (79.7%).

The least acceptable solution is an “erga omnes solution” which is unacceptable for 40.8% of the citizens. The view against “erga omnes” is stronger than in all previous researches, as for example in 2013 it amounted to 19.9%, which is most probably because it is becoming clear that this is Greece’s main demand. “Erga omnes” is unacceptable for the majority of ethnic Macedonians (50.6%), whereas “no change” is unacceptable for 40.8% of ethnic Albanians.

**The gap between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in finding a solution is deepening**

Ethnic differences, that is, the views of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians drew near in 2011 when it comes to resolving the dispute and the support for a referendum, but since 2013 they have started pulling away, so now the gap in the views has deepened. Such increase in the gap between the views of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians is visible on several issues.

When it comes to the views on “keeping the name” as opposed to “Euro-Atlantic integration”, 44.6% of ethnic Macedonians would opt to keep the name (64.9% in 2013), whereas 90.1% of ethnic Albanians would opt for Euro-Atlantic integration (68% in 2013).

In the views on resolving the dispute, what is the most acceptable for ethnic Macedonians, “no change” (59.6%), is the least acceptable for ethnic Albanians (40.8%), and vice versa - what is the most acceptable for ethnic Albanians, “erga omnes” (42.3%), is the least acceptable for ethnic Macedonians (50.6%).

The gap would be the deepest in case of a referendum for name change whereby 85% of ethnic Albanians would vote “yes” opposed to 62% of ethnic Macedonians who would vote “no”.

Such gap does not lead to an increase in the risk of deteriorating inter-ethnic relations (in case of not resolving the dispute), which risk perception amounts to 19.7% (23.7% in 2013 and 13.8% in 2011).

**A joined name is fully unacceptable, for half of the citizens a geographic determinant - Upper and Skopje - is unacceptable, and addition after the name more acceptable than other options**

A joined name (e.g. Gornamakedonija - Uppermacedonia) is unacceptable for a vast majority of the citizens (79.1%), which is even more significant among ethnic Macedonians (89.9%).

Half of the citizens (44.9%), as well as the majority of ethnic Macedonians (55.1%), accept no geographic determinant. Of the proposed geographic determinants, the most acceptable ones are Upper and Skopje, as well as a geographic determinant as an addition to the name (24.4%).

**Non-exclusive use of Macedonia, against change in codes**

The citizens find the non-exclusive use of the term Macedonia from both countries as acceptable (53.5%), whereas 33.6% of the citizens believe that only Macedonia has the right to use the term.

A large majority of citizens oppose the change in codes, specifically the MK country code (71.7%) and the Internet code (69.2%).

**Government measures on building trust unaccepted**

The majority of citizens (51%), fully or somewhat, do not justify the renaming of the airport and the highway. This view is stronger among ethnic Macedonians (62.6%). A large majority of citizens (65.6%) find the removal of the “Warrior on a horse” statue unacceptable. While this is unacceptable for 77.9% of ethnic Macedonians (97.6% of VMRO-DPMNE supporters, 46.3% of SDSM supporters) it is acceptable for 69% of ethnic Albanians.

### **The agreement should take effect when we become an EU member**

Apart from the citizens who would never want for an agreement to enter into force for they find the name change unacceptable, 35.6% of citizens believe that the most appropriate moment for the agreement to enter into force is when Macedonia will become an EU member state so that there is no new conditioning. This view is probably shaped under the influence of the position that there is a risk for Greece to have additional demands from Macedonia, even after the agreement. This view is shared by 34.2% of the citizens.

### **Identity as the granite red line**

The identity remains to be the granite red line, which is also reflected in the position against any change of the name, but also in the opposing against completing the definition of the nationality/ citizenship and the Macedonian language in the UN. Defining Macedonian nationality/ citizenship is accepted by 47.9% (59.1% of ethnic Macedonians), certain variations such as Latin or double use is accepted by 25.3%, whereas the definition as a citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia is accepted by 14.4% of the citizens (34.7% of ethnic Albanians). The views are similar to these on the definition of the language.

### **Language, Constitution and citizenship the most important for the identity, the Constitution and the constitutional name rampart for its defence**

Citizens believe that language (27.45%), the Constitution (23.5%) and citizenship (23.1%) are the most important to preserve the identity of the Macedonian people.

Almost half of the citizens (45.1%) believe that by changing the constitutional name, the identity will change, whereas 17.8% believe that Macedonian identity will not change in any situation. A large majority of citizens (73.8%) think that a change in the constitutional name will impact the identity a lot or somewhat.

Therefore, there is strong resistance to changing the Constitution, that is to say, 48.3% of the citizens and 60.7% of ethnic Macedonians are against any change in the Constitution, regardless of whether it is a question of name provisions or other questions. A change in the Constitution on defining the international name is acceptable for 18.3% of citizens.

### **The name, the identity, (stand-still) in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, fear of new demands from Greece and internal divisions are the main factors influencing the name dispute**

“Keeping the name” versus “Euro-Atlantic integration”, which is of significance for everyone, as well as the threats associated therewith, are the main factors influencing the name dispute.

For the first time since these researches have been conducted does Euro-Atlantic integration (49.7%) have priority as opposed to keeping the name (35%). The unity among ethnic Albanians about Euro-Atlantic integration contributes to this (90.1%), whereas among ethnic Macedonians keeping the name is of leading priority (44.6%).

In the first case of non-resolution of the dispute, the following is perceived as main threats: stand-still in Euro-Atlantic integration, economic stand-still and deterioration of inter-ethnic relations. In the second case of solution to the name dispute, the following is perceived as main threats: Greek demands for new concessions, internal divisions and conflicts, and that the EU is not ready for enlargement. It seems that the perceptions of these threats which are threats for the survival of the nation are the main moving force in refusing an agreement with Greece. The fear of new Greek demands is based on experience: Greece has used three times so far (1991/92; 1994/95 and 2008) trade and political blockages in order to exert pressure to change the Constitution, the flag, etc., as well as the fact that Greece violates the Interim Accord and does not respect the verdict of the International Court of Justice.

### **Far from reaching a broad agreement**

A majority of the citizens (55.1%) think that there is no broad agreement, that is to say, national consensus. Furthermore, there is no clear perception as to what the position of the Government is in the spectrum from no change to erga omnes.

Citizens perceive Gjorgje Ivanov, the President of the Republic and VMRO-DPMNE to be on the side of “keeping the name”, whereas the Government and SDSM, as well as DUI and Besa, on the side of “Euro-Atlantic integration”.

More citizens (41.7%) and ethnic Macedonians (49.6%) would not vote in the next elections for the party that will resolve the name dispute, as opposed to 36% who would vote for.

### **Citizens want a referendum prior to the agreement, the outcome depends on the EU**

The expectations that citizens be given the opportunity to express their opinion through a referendum are on a continuous rise, amounting to 71.4% in 2018, starting from 54.4% in 2010, to 64% in 2011 and 66.3% in 2013.

A large majority of ethnic Macedonians (79.3%) opt for a referendum, whereas ethnic Albanians are divided.

It seems that EU membership is a factor that could influence the outcome of the referendum. Whereas citizens would reject a change of the name, 50.2% being against and 41.5% for, the views change provided that the name change happens when the country becomes an EU member, in which case 45% opt against and 47.6% for a change. This is a change compared to 2013, and the vote against has decreased by approximately 10 percentage points (2013 - 62.7% against, 58.4% against in case of EU membership).

### **Strong wishes, lower expectations of a solution**

While every second citizen (48%) desires a solution within one year, such expectations are held by every fourth citizen (26.3%). Expectations have increased compared to 2013, and there is a drop in the attitude that there will never be a solution found. In addition, there is an increase in the perception from 13.8% in 2013 to 33.3% that both sides are making efforts to find a solution. A majority of the citizens (62.9%) believe that there is interest among the great powers to resolve the name dispute, and the USA and the EU are perceived as third parties that could contribute to finding a solution.

### **Window for solution: acceptance of identity by Greece, a solution in two stages and EU membership**

The relation between “keeping the name” and “Euro-Atlantic integration” can be under the influence of identity questions (the Constitution, language, nationality), as well as the fear of further demands imposed by Greece for new concessions, and internal divisions and conflicts.

Defining language and nationality/ citizenship as Macedonian, as well as keeping the country code (MK) and the language can decrease the feeling of identity threat. It is similar with adding a geographic determinant as an addition after the name, e.g. Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).

Dealing with both threats, the one of new concessions and the one of internal divisions is a precondition for strengthening the support for an agreement.

Postponing the change in the Constitution at the moment of entering the EU is exceedingly important for the fear of new demands from Greece. It is hard to expect that Greece will recognise the Macedonian nation directly (identity, culture and language), so a possible solution is the proposal of Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative (ESI). The solution is that the possible agreement between Greece and Macedonia take effect on the day of entry of Macedonia to the EU (in NATO it would be accepted under the temporary reference). In this way, Greece would shift from a blocker to a promoter of Macedonian membership, and Macedonia would know that there will be no new obstacles on the road to the EU set by Greece and that there will be no change of the name unless Macedonia becomes an EU member due to other reasons, such as countries opposing enlargement (possible referendum in France or vetoes by countries influenced by the far right).

The second fear of internal divisions can be overcome by applying a “framework model”, that is to say, the possible agreement with Greece to be approved in writing by all major political parties.



## ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1. QUESTIONNAIRE

#### The Name Dispute with Greece - views of citizens 2018 Questionnaire

**Q1. In your opinion, is there a broad agreement in Macedonia - a consensus between relevant political parties on the name dispute? There is:**

1. Full consensus
2. Certain consensus
3. Partially there is no consensus
4. There is no consensus at all
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q2. Please carefully look at the following statements that are heard in the public on solving the name dispute.**

**Q2.1.** Please choose the statement that **best reflects your view**.

**Q2.2.** Please choose a **second statement** that **best reflects your view**.

**Q2.3.** Please choose the statement that **least reflects your view**.

**Q2.4.** Please choose the statement that you think is **closest to the current position of the Government of RM**

**Statements on a card:**

1. The solution to the name dispute is use of an agreed name only in international organisations (UN, NATO, EU, etc.), while the countries would address us upon their own choice and agreement in bilateral relations [**agreed name in international organisations**].

2. The solution to the dispute is the use of the name Republic Macedonia in the internal and international communication, while Greece can use another name [**double formula**].

3. Macedonia should accept no change [**no change**].

4. The solution to the dispute is to accept a new constitutional name for all usages [**a new "erga omnes" name for all usages**].

5. The solution to the name dispute is the use of an agreed name for overall international and bilateral use, while the Republic of Macedonia would be for domestic/ internal use only [**agreed name for overall international use**].

6. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q3. In order to reach a solution, it is acceptable for me to change the Constitution:**

1. by changing the constitutional name
2. no change to the constitutional name, but determining an international name
3. by changing provisions not related with the name
4. no change to the Constitution is acceptable (ILLEGIBLE)
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q4. Which adjective/ addition would be the most acceptable to reach a solution?  
(ANSWERS ARE ROTATING)**

1. North
2. Upper
3. Vardar
4. New
5. Skopje
6. None is acceptable (ILLEGIBLE)
7. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q5. Let's take for example that the agreement is to add the geographic determinant "Upper", where in your opinion should this adjective be added?**

1. Adjective **before the Republic of Macedonia** e.g. Upper Republic of Macedonia
2. Adjective **after the Republic, and before Macedonia** e.g. Republic of Upper Macedonia
3. Adjective **after the Republic of Macedonia** e.g. Republic of Macedonia (Upper).
4. None is acceptable (ILLEGIBLE)
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q6. Is it acceptable for you to have a joined name e.g. Gornamakedonija (Uppermacedonia):**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q7. Of the following definitions of nationality/ citizenship in the United Nations, which one is the most acceptable for you?**

**Q7a. What is the next acceptable option for you?**

1. Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia
2. Citizen of the Republic of Upper Macedonia / Macedonian
3. Makedonsko
4. Macedonian
5. Not a single one is acceptable (ILLEGIBLE)
9. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q8. Of the following definitions of the language in the United Nations, which one is the most acceptable for you?**

**Q8a. What is the next acceptable option for you?**

1. Language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia
2. Language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia / Macedonian
3. Makedonski
4. Macedonian (Official language of the Republic of Upper Macedonia)
5. Macedonian
6. Not a single one is acceptable (ILLEGIBLE)
7. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q9. Should the term be used by:**

1. both countries
2. only Macedonia
3. only Greece
4. neither country
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q10. Is it acceptable for you to change the MK country code in order to reach a solution with Greece?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q11. Is it acceptable for you to change the MK Internet country code (for E-Mails, websites - <http://www.fixit.mk>) in order to reach a solution with Greece?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q12. How justified is in your opinion the renaming of the airport from Alexander the Great to International Airport Skopje and the highway from Alexander the Great to Friendship in order to reach a solution with Greece?**

1. Fully justified
2. Somewhat justified
3. Somewhat not justified
4. Not justified at all
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q13. Is it acceptable for you to remove the Warrior on a Horse statue (in Skopje) in order to resolve the dispute with Greece?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q14. If an agreement is reached with Greece, when should it take effect (when should it start being applied)?**

1. Immediately after the agreement, independently from the NATO and EU integration, or
2. Postponed, to the moment we become an EU member, so that there are no new conditions
3. Never, no change of the name is acceptable to me (ILLEGIBLE)
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q15. Is it necessary for citizens to express their opinion through a referendum for the possible solution to the name dispute?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q16. In a referendum asking the following question - SHOW A CARD**

**"Do you agree with the change of the name to Republic of Upper Macedonia?", how will you vote?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I won't vote (ILLEGIBLE)
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q17. If a referendum is to be held, when should it be held:**

1. Before concluding an agreement on the name dispute with Greece
2. During the entry to NATO
3. During a referendum for EU membership
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q18. In a referendum asking the following question - SHOW A CARD**

**"Do you agree with the change of the name to Republic of Upper Macedonia when the country becomes an EU member", how will you vote?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I won't vote (ILLEGIBLE)
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q19. In a referendum asking the following question - SHOW A CARD**

**"Do you agree with the change of the FYROM reference to Republic of Upper Macedonia?", how will you vote?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I won't vote (ILLEGIBLE)
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q20. Which of these two statements is the closest to your own view/ conviction?**

1 - Of course, both Macedonia (the name) and Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU) are important. However, if I am to choose between the two of them, I would consider **keeping the name more important** on the cost that it leads to a stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integration and maybe negatively impacts the economic growth.

2 - Of course, both Macedonia and Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU) are important. However, if I am to choose between the two of them, I would consider the **Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU) more important**, to provide a perspective for the country, even if we are to accept a compromise with Greece, which does not endanger the Macedonian identity, culture and language

3 - I do not agree with any of the given statements (spontaneously)

4 - I don't know/ No answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q21. When would you personally want the name dispute to be resolved?**

1. In 1 year
2. In 2-5 years
3. Unidentified, as long as it takes for a reasonable agreement
4. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q22. How long do you think it will take to resolve the name dispute?**

1. 1 year
2. 2-5 years
3. 6-10 years
4. More than 10 years
5. I don't know (ILLEGIBLE)
6. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q23. Do you believe in the dedication of Macedonia and Greece to find a solution?**

1. I believe that both countries are making efforts to find a solution
2. I believe that only the Macedonian side is making efforts to find a solution
3. I believe that only the Greek side is making efforts to find a solution
4. I believe that both countries are equally not making any efforts to find a solution
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q24. Is there any interest to resolve the name dispute with Greece among the great powers?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q25. In your opinion, which third party can contribute the most to resolving the dispute?**

1. UN
2. USA
3. EU
4. Russia
5. Germany
6. France
7. Great Britain
8. None (ILLEGIBLE)
9. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q26. In your opinion, what of the following is very probable to happen if the name dispute with Greece is not resolved? Up to 2 choices**

1. Stand-still in Euro-Atlantic integration (EU, NATO)
2. Deterioration of inter-ethnic relations
3. Economic stand-still
4. Deterioration of security
5. Other \_\_\_\_\_
6. Nothing will happen (ILLEGIBLE)
7. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q27. In your opinion, what of the following is very probable to happen after the resolution of the name dispute with Greece? Up to 2 choices**

1. Regardless of the agreement, the EU is not ready for enlargement
2. The agreement will cause clashes within Macedonia (between those supporting and those not supporting the agreement)
3. Greece will have additional demands of Macedonia
4. Other \_\_\_\_\_
5. Nothing will happen (ILLEGIBLE)
6. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q28. If the big parties support the possible agreement and there is a referendum, would you participate in?**

1. I would join campaigns and gatherings in support of and voting FOR the agreement
2. I would join campaigns and gatherings against this agreement and voting AGAINST the agreement
3. None from the offered (ILLEGIBLE)
4. I don't know - depends on the final solution (ILLEGIBLE)
5. No answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q29. In your opinion, in what situation will the Macedonian identity change?**

1. If the constitutional name is changed
2. If the name for international use is changed
3. If the fYROM reference is changed
4. In every situation (ILLEGIBLE)
5. In no situation will the Macedonian identity change (ILLEGIBLE)
6. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q30. If the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia is changed, to what extent will that impact the identity Macedonians, Macedonian and Macedonian language?**

1. Will impact a lot
2. Will impact somewhat
3. Will somewhat not impact
4. Will not impact at all
5. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q31. In your opinion, what is the most important for the preservation of the identity of the Macedonian people? What else? Up to 2 choices**

1. The flag
2. The language
3. Citizenship
4. The Constitution
5. The history
6. Myths, stories and tradition
7. The food
8. Folklore
9. Other \_\_\_\_\_
10. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

**Q32. Looking at the following scale, where the one end is held by the view that The name cannot be changed in any way, even if the price to pay is the Euro-Atlantic integration, while the other end is held by the position that Euro-Atlantic integration is the most important, even if it is necessary to change the name, where would you position**

1. President Ivanov \_\_\_\_\_
2. The ruling political party - SDSM \_\_\_\_\_
3. The political party in opposition - VMRO-DPMNE \_\_\_\_\_
4. The political party DUI \_\_\_\_\_
5. The political party BESA \_\_\_\_\_
6. The Government \_\_\_\_\_

**Q33. In your opinion, on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 is the lowest, and 5 the highest mark, how successful are the following politicians at coping with the resolution of the name dispute?**

1. Prime Minister Zaev \_\_\_\_\_
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs - Dimitrov \_\_\_\_\_
3. The Government of RM \_\_\_\_\_

**Q34. If the name dispute is resolved, I will vote for the party which resolved the dispute?**

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know/ no answer (ILLEGIBLE)

## Demographics

**1. Gender**

1. Male
2. Female

**2. Age** \_\_\_\_\_

**3. Ethnicity**

1. Macedonian
2. Albanian
3. Roma
4. Turkish
5. Serbian
6. Vlach
7. Bosnian
8. Other

**4. Last completed education:**

1. Incomplete primary education
2. Primary education
3. Secondary education
4. College
5. University
6. Graduate studies

**5. Working status:**

1. Employed in a public institution
2. Employed in a private institution
3. Employed in a non-governmental institution
4. Self-employed
5. Farmer
6. Unemployed
7. Engaged with domestic chores
8. Student/ pupil
9. Pensioner

**6. What is (in Denars) the average net income in your household (including scholarship, pension, child benefit, etc.)** \_\_\_\_\_

**7. Populated area**

1. Village
2. Town

**8. Region** \_\_\_\_\_

## ANNEX 2. SAMPLE STRUCTURE - POPULATION

The field survey sample encompassed 1.004 respondents. The population frame of the sample was population older than 18 years of age, and the representativeness criteria were: gender, age, ethnicity, place of living and regions.

Gender	%
Male	48.0
Female	52.0
Age	
From 18 to 29 years	22.6
From 30 to 39 years	18.5
From 40 to 49 years	18.3
From 50 to 64 years	24.1
Over 65	16.4
Ethnicity	
Macedonian	69.7
Albanian	21.2
Turkish	3.1
Roma	0.6
Serbian	1.7
Vlach	0.7
Bosnian	0.6
Other	2.4
Education	
Primary or less	18.2
Secondary	53.2
Higher secondary/ high	28.6
Place of Living	
Rural	38.9
Urban	61.1

Working status	%
Employed in a public institution	16.5
Employed in a private institution	23.5
Unemployed	17.0
Self-employed	5.7
Student/ pupil	7.9
Pensioner	16.7
Other	12.6
Region	
Skopje	32.0
Southeast	8.0
East	9.3
Northeast	8.0
Vardar	8.0
Southwest	10.0
Polog	12.9
Pelagonia	12.0

## PUBLISHERS' PROFILES

MCIC has been a significant player in civil society in Macedonia and the region for more than 20 years, based on values and interests and their representation and influence on the society. MCIC's vision is peace, harmony and prosperity of people in Macedonia, on the Balkans and globally. In order to turn this vision into reality, MCIC's mission is to lead changes for resolving the societal problems in innovative and alternative way, thus affecting the other mainstream actors.

MCIC is active in the fields of social cohesion (employment, education, dialogue and cultural diversity), local and rural development, civil society and good governance. Since 1993, MCIC has implemented over 1.500 projects, as part of around 65 programmes worth more than Euro 50 million.

IDSCS is a civil organisation founded in 1999 by a group of intellectuals gathered around the idea of democracy, solidarity and civil society. The long-term goals of the Institute involve working on a balanced socio-economic development, active citizen engagement and participative political culture, as well as embodiment of liberal values in Macedonian society. IDSCS bases its work primarily on sociometric research and project activities. We believe that human capital is the main precondition for a positive societal change, thus we work devotedly on projects aimed at improving capacities, by transfer of knowledge and skills.

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## CONTUNUE READING

### List of publications of MCIC

<http://www.mcms.mk/mk/za-nasata-rabota/istrazuvana-i-publikacii/lista-na-istrazuvana-i-publikacii.html>

### List of publications of IDSCS

[http://idscs.org.mk/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=205&Itemid=93&lang=mk](http://idscs.org.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=205&Itemid=93&lang=mk)

### List of related publications

<http://www.mcms.mk/images/docs/2011/sporot-za-imeto-makedonija-2011.pdf>

<http://www.mcms.mk/mk/vesti-i-javnost/vesti/1002-stavovi-na-graganite-za-resenie-na-bilateralniot-spor-na-makedonija-so-grcija.html>

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