



MACEDONIAN CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION



MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE

- *Public Views in Macedonia* -



Publishers

Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC)

Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis – Skopje (IDSCS)

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FOREWORD

The Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (MCIC) is a leading civil society organisation in Macedonia and the region, established in 1993. The Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis (IDSCS) is a leading organisation for promotion of democracy established in 1999.

Both MCIC and IDSCS are focused on the democratic development of Macedonia and the European policies and integrations.

MCIC has continuously supported the right to the name Macedonia. In 2004, together with other organisations, it organised and participated in “Say Macedonia” (Don’t You FYROM Me) campaign. In 2008, with a joint statement “Both Macedonia and NATO” MCIC, together with several organisations again gave its opinion on the name as a right to self-identification rather than a dispute.

However, after not being invited to NATO membership in 2008, as well as after the stand-still in the EU integrations since 2009, the Macedonia name dispute has become the main obstacle in the Euro-Atlantic integrations of Macedonia.

In 2010 MCIC conducted the first public opinion research in Macedonia on Macedonia name dispute.

In 2011, MCIC and IDSC, led by the stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integrations in Macedonia and the need for policies based on facts conducted a new research on Macedonia name dispute.

The research should contribute to opening a broader debate on the name dispute which would include all relevant actors. The report shows the opinion of the citizens on the name dispute, which should be used by the decision makers.

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Public Views in Macedonia

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

VMRO-DPMNE	VMRO – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Union
EU	European Union
DPA	Democratic Party of the Albanians
DUI	Democratic Union for Integration
MCIC	Macedonian Center for International Cooperation
IDSCS	Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis -- Skopje
UN	The Organization of the United Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Alliance
SDSM	The Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	The United Nations Protection Force
NA	no answer
DK	don't know

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Macedonia name dispute has become the main obstacle in the Euro-Atlantic integrations of Macedonia. In 2011, MCIC and IDSCS, led by the stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integrations of Macedonia and the need for policies based on facts, conducted a new public opinion research on the Macedonia name dispute.

The citizens remain **against any change of the name**, i.e. almost half of the citizens are firmly against any change of the name, they opted for no change on the question on possible solution (45.3%), that they accept no geographic determinant (44.6%), they opt for keeping the name despite any stand-stills (39.6%), and they would vote “no” at a possible referendum for a name for overall international usage (58.4%). The majority who are for no changes is bigger among the ethnic Macedonians (57% are for no change). The views are changed very little since December 2010.

There is an on-going **national uniting around the name dispute** and in 2011, the ethnic differences have decreased, i.e. the views are approximated in line that the solution is between no change at all and an agreed name for the international organizations. The citizens of all ethnic and party affiliations defend the red line on identity (against completing the definition on the language) and they ask for a decision on the name at a referendum.

There is a **small window of compromise**, possibly after the decision of the International Court of Justice (36.9% of the citizens expect a favourable decision for Macedonia). The Euro-Atlantic integrations are important to 40.5% of the citizens and they think that a compromise should be accepted with Greece, one that would not endanger the Macedonian identity, culture and language. Possible compromises are the “double formula” (20.8%) and an agreed name for the international organizations (19.2%). The majority of citizens want a solution in a year, and most of them expect it in a medium, long term or never. The possible model for an acceptable compromise for the citizens, although with a minority support in the research is “Northern Republic of Macedonia” or “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)”, as an agreed name for usage in the international organizations (UN, EU and NATO).

The identity is the granite red line – the majority of the citizens (69.4%) and the big majority of the ethnic Macedonians are against UN defining the nationality/citizenship as “citizens of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”. The big majority of citizens (74%) and ethnic Macedonians (87%) and most of the citizens of all ethnic groups are against completing the definition of the language in UN, for example as Macedonian language (official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia).

There is a consensus that the name will be decided at a referendum. The majority of the citizens (64%) of all ethnic and party affiliation ask for a decision on the name at a referendum. The support of the referendum has increased since December 2010, including the ethnic Albanians.

58.4% at the referendum would vote against the agreed name for overall international use, every fourth citizen would join **self-organised protests** against the change of the name.

The fear of stand-still, the risk of new concessions and division, motives for and against the solution. The citizens fear that Greece would ask for new concessions on identity and language until it destroys the Macedonian identity (40.4%) and that there would be a division to traitors and patriots (21.7%). These two threats are threats for the survival of the nation and they are probably the main motive for refusing the compromise. Both fears of new concessions and a division could be resolved with certain solutions. The fear of new demands on the Greek side can be mitigated with the proposal of Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative (ESI), that the possible agreement between Greece and Macedonia takes effect on the day Macedonia joins the EU (it would join NATO under the interim reference). In this way, Greece would transform from an obstacle to a promoter of the Macedonian membership in EU, and Macedonia would know that there are no new obstacles on the way to EU, regardless whether they are put by Greece or countries that are against new members (possible referendum in France of vetoes by EU members with extreme right wing parties influence). The latter fear of division could be overcome by a “Framework Agreement”, i.e. the possible agreement with Greece should be approved in writing by all main political parties.

MACEDONIA NAME DISPUTE

Public Views in Macedonia

I INTRODUCTION

The Macedonia Name Dispute – Public Views in Macedonia report shows the results of the public opinion survey. The report is made of parts on methodology, short history of the dispute, views of the citizens on dispute resolution, responsibility for the solution, as well as their priorities, motives and reactions about the possible solution on the name dispute.

The survey is a joint enterprise of MCIC and IDSCS and the field survey was implemented by IDSCS.

I.1. Methodology and approach

The public opinion survey was conducted by face-to-face interviews in households by IDSCS from 10 to 24 September 2011, on a representative sample of 1,090 people with a +/-3% margin of error.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire (Annex 1) was prepared based on the questionnaire of the population survey conducted on the same topic in December 2010, and upgraded in accordance with the current issues on the name of Macedonia. It covered some 30 variables that refer to the views of the citizens on the name dispute and its resolution. The independent variables covered the socio-demographic characteristics.

Sample

The public opinion survey was conducted on a national representative sample (Annex 2), and the representativeness criteria were: gender, ethnic affiliation, age, place of living and regions. Out of the 1,090 people surveyed, 55.2% were women, and 44.8% were man; with respect to the ethnic affiliation, 66.3% of the people surveyed were Macedonians, and 26.8% were Albanians, while the other ethnic groups were represented with 6.8%. With respect to the place of living, the rural population was represented with 37.8%, and the urban one with 62.2% (the city of Skopje with 21.1%).

I.2. Terms and Definitions

The report uses terms, for example, on the possible solutions that are defined in Table 1. The overview of the formulations used for name solutions.

Macedonia or the Republic of Macedonia meaning the name of the state is used for the state Republic of Macedonia.

Nationality is used in the sense of belonging to a state, citizenship, rather than ethnic affiliation. When it comes to defining nationality at UN, it is explained by citizenship. The conclusions use national unification as unification of the nation/citizens.

The report does not suggest that a solution has been found; appropriate and possible solution and/or solution is used for some future or possible solution. All examples are hypothetical and given as illustration to the possible solutions.

I.4. Result Processing and Presentation

The results are shown in graphs at a total sample level. Apart from the graphs, the data are also shown in figures.

The report uses insignificant minority for responses that are less than 10% of the sample, small minority when there are 11% to 30%, minority for 30% to 50%, majority for 51% to 70% and big majority for more than 70%.

The socio-demographic analyses for the smaller socio-demographic groups are not commented in this report due to their small participation in the national sample.

Certain tables and graphs in the report do not include the results for “don’t know” and “no answer”, and therefore the sum of all answers is not 100%. The reason for this is to simplify the presentation of the results.

I.5. Research Limitations

The course of the talks under the auspices of the UN and the possible solutions are neither publicly communicated nor do MCIC and IDSCS have any knowledge about them. Therefore, certain questions were asked under certain assumptions to provide illustrations and examples of possible solutions. For example, the agreed name used in the referendum question – the Central Balkan Republic of Macedonia is only an example of a name with a geographic determinant before the name Republic of Macedonia, which is mentioned sometimes, without any knowledge if it is part of the talks on the name differences.

II SHORT HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE

II.1. Start of the Dispute and the Interim accord

The Macedonia name dispute became visible (current) after the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991, when Greece opposed the usage of the name Macedonia by the Republic of Macedonia, referring to historical and territorial reasons. Greece considered that it had the exclusive right to use the name for its province of Macedonia and its inhabitants.

Although Macedonia fulfilled the conditions for recognition of its independence (together with Slovenia) in front of the Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia, Greece blocked the recognition by the European Union (EU), as well as its joining the Organisation of the United Nations (UN). On 27 June 1992, the EU (then EEC), under the influence of Greece, in the so-called offered the recognition in the country “under a name that would not contain the word Macedonia”. Apart from this, Greece blocked the Macedonian-Greek border for any trade on two occasions in the period 1992-1995, in order to exercise pressure on the Republic of Macedonia. In December 1992, UN established a preventive security mission UNPROFOR in Macedonia, among other countries of the former Yugoslav federation, and in 1995 it was replaced by UNPREDEP; the mandate of the latter ended in 1999.

Greece expressed its concern that the Articles 3 and 49 of the Constitution of Macedonia stimulate territorial aspirations. In order to decrease the concern of the possible territorial aspirations, on 6 January 1992, the Parliament of Macedonia adopted the Amendments I and II of the Constitution, which change and amend Articles 3 and 49. On 7 April 1993, the Security Council of the UN approved to accept Macedonia in the United Nations with its Resolution 817, with a recommendation that the temporary reference “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” is used for the country for all purposes within the UN, until there is a resolution to the name differences. The General Assembly accepted Macedonia as the 181st member of the UN with its Resolution 225 on 8 April 1993. The temporary reference, which is a reflection of the past of Macedonia starts with small letters, because it is not a name but a descriptive term and the reference is not an international name, but it is used only in the UN. To confirm this, Macedonia obtained its seat in the UN under the letter “t”, coming from “the former...”.

On 18 June 1993, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 845, which asks for intensification of resolving the differences, and the Secretary General appointed Cyrus Vence for his special representative until 1995; since 1995 this function has been given to Matthew Nimetz.

On 13 September 1995, Greece and Macedonia signed an Interim Accord, in which both parties agree: Macedonia will guarantee that there are no territorial aspirations in the Preamble and Articles 3 and 49 of its Constitution and it will change its national flag (by the Vergina sun), and Greece will not block the entry of Macedonia in international organisations, and the parties will continue the talks on the differences under the auspices of the UN.

From 1995 to 2008, the mediator Matthew Nimetz proposed a number of possible solutions which were unacceptable for one of the two parties.

II.2. Not Being Invited to NATO and Not Starting the EU Membership Negotiations

At the North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO) Summit in Bucharest, on 3 April 2008, Macedonia did not get a membership application, although supported by the USA, due to the inability to find a solution for the name dispute.

In the fall of 2008, Macedonia started a process before the International Court of Justice on violations of the Interim accord obligations by Greece, i.e. on the alleged blocking the NATO membership of Macedonia. The decision of the court is expected for 2011/12.

In 2009, Macedonia received a recommendation for opening negotiations for EU membership, but at the same time there was a request for “agreed and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue, under the auspices of the UN, remains essential”. There was no date for opening of the negotiations set for Macedonia in 2009 and 2010.

II.3. Current Situation of the Dispute, Positions of Greece and Macedonia

Macedonia has been accepted under the temporary reference in all international organisations. More than 130 countries recognise Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia, including four out of the five permanent members of the UN (with the exception of France), and many countries do not use the temporary reference, while part of them have no position/interest in this issue.

Therefore, the **existing position** is the temporary reference for the international organisations, and more countries accept the name Republic of Macedonia in the inter-governmental official bilateral relations, while some use the temporary reference.

In the discussions led under the auspices of the UN with the mediation of Mathew Niemitz, various possible solutions have been discussed on a number of occasions, but without any success. According to unofficial sources, **the last 2008 proposal** was that the Republic of Macedonia remains the official name in the Constitution (in Macedonian), the name of the country in all international organisations (i.e. UN, EU, NATO) is “the Republic of Northern Macedonia”; the Security Council proposed that the name “the Republic of Northern Macedonia” is used in the inter-governmental official relations with third countries. The name “Macedonia” in itself cannot be used by any of the two parties as the official name of the country or the region, both parties on a non-exclusive bases for unofficial purposes can use the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian”. Both names will be written on the passports: the Republic of Northern Macedonia in English and French, and the Republic of Macedonia in Macedonian. This proposal can be interpreted as a proposal that tends towards **a name for international usage**. It tends, because besides the international organisations it should be used in the bilateral relations; however, although the Security Council can recommend usage in the bilateral relations, every country has the sovereign right to decide under which name it will establish diplomatic relations¹.

In 2009/11 there have been efforts to approximate the views of the two countries around the name differences at a number of meetings of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Macedonia.

The position of Greece from “one name that will not contain the word Macedonia” for all usages has evolved into “one name that will contain the word Macedonia and a geographic determinant” for all usages. The “erga omnes” position, or a position for all usages is in two meanings for “all international usages”, including the passport, or “for all usages”, including internal usage. Greece has refused the proposal Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) for international usage.

The position of Macedonia on the dispute is a solution that will not change the Constitution of Macedonia in order to change the constitutional name and will not endanger the Macedonian national identity, the individuality of the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian language; the citizens (the majority) should agree with the possible solution at a referendum.

¹ This is the example with Taiwan, which establishes diplomatic relations only under the name Republic of China.

III SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE

III.1. Scope of the Name Usage

In the part of dispute solutions, the views of the citizens on the elements of the solution have been researched: an acceptable name and scope of usage; geographic determinant; naming the nation and the language; as well as the time when the possible agreement would take effect.

When the views on the acceptable solution to the dispute have been surveyed, the citizens were asked to choose two most acceptable and one fully unacceptable solution out of the possible **five solutions**. The possible solutions refer to the **scope of the usage** of the compromise name and they move from one to another extreme position, i.e. from the position of Greece for “accepting a **new name** (with a geographic determinant) **for all usages**” to the position “Macedonia should accept **no changes**”.

Table 1: Overview of descriptions used for name solutions

Abbreviated description in the report	Description used in the questionnaire
1. New “erga omnes” name for all usages	The solution to the dispute is to accept a new name for all usages.
2. Agreed name for (overall) international usage	The solution to the dispute is the usage of an agreed name in all international communication, while the Republic of Macedonia would only be for internal use.
3. Agreed name for the international organisations	The solution to the name dispute is the usage of an agreed name in the international organisations (UN, NATO, EU etc.) while the other countries would name us upon their own choice and agreement.
4. “The double formula”	The solution to the dispute is the usage of the name Republic of Macedonia in the internal and international communication, while Greece can use another name.
5. No change	Macedonia should accept no change

“The double formula” or “Irish formula” according to Robin O’Neil is based on the solution between Ireland and Great Britain, according to which Ireland can call Great Britain differently than its official name. Between the “erga omnes” and “double formula” positions there are two more solutions, an agreed name in the international organisations or for an overall international usage. The agreed name for the international organisations corresponds to the current position of the usage of the temporary reference and this option would actually mean a change of the temporary reference by a permanent name. Of course, there are different variants of these two solutions possible. The double formula is usually, as in this report, exclusively related to a single solution. In a broader sense, besides no change and new name for all usages, **all solutions are double formulas with different scopes** – the Republic of Macedonia for internal usage and the new name in a different scope for international usage – only for Greece or for all.

Table 2 shows the views of the citizens on the first and second best and the least acceptable solution in (December) 2010 and (September) 2011.

Table 2: The first and second, and least acceptable solution, 2010 and 2011

	First best		Second best		Least acceptable	
	2010	2011	2010	2011	2010	2011
New “erga omnes” name for all usages	10.5%	7.5%	10.2%	9.6%	26.9%	29.0%
Agreed name for international usage	2.9%	5.1%	3.7%	7.8%	25.2%	20.8%
Agreed name for the international organisations	12.3%	19.2%	11.0%	21.3%	7.6%	15.7%
“The double formula”	25.0%	20.8%	31.9%	30.7%	7.4%	9.7%
No change	48.4%	45.3%	16.1%	20.1%	15.7%	15.6%
DK/NA	1.0%	2.0%	27.0%	10.5%	17.1%	9.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Almost **one of two citizens is against any change**, one in five would accept the “double formula”, and one in three would accept one out of the three other solutions. “No change” and the “double formula” together comprise **66.1% or two out of the three citizens** (two-third majority). The least acceptable are the solutions for a new name for all usages or agreed name for international usage. For 15.7% of the citizens, it is unacceptable that Macedonia does not accept any change.

With respect to the views of 2010, there are no significant changes, there is a small drop of “no change” and “double formula” and a small increase of the support to “agreed name in the international organisations”.

In 2010, there were differences on ethnic basis, without more significant differences on party affiliation, and **in 2011 the ethnic differences decrease**. For the majority (57%) ethnic Macedonians the best solution is “no change”, while with the ethnic Albanians the views are more diverse, and there is most support (28.3%) for an agreed name for international organisations. For the ethnic Macedonians a new name for all usages is the least acceptable choice, and for the ethnic Albanians the least acceptable choice is no change.

Table 3: The views on the solution of the dispute, according to ethnic affiliation

View	First best		Second best		Least acceptable	
	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.
New name for all usages	4.8%	12.3%	8.7%	21.5%	34.4%	17.1%
Agreed name for international usage	2.4%	11.3%	5.4%	14.3%	19.6%	22.9%
Agreed name for the international organisations	15.1%	28.3%	17.7%	29.0%	16.5%	11.9%
“The double formula”	19.4%	25.6%	35.8%	20.5%	7.7%	11.9%
No change	57.0%	19.8%	19.2%	21.5%	10.2%	31.1%
No answer	1.4%	2.7%	13.1%	4.1%	11.5%	5.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

With the ethnic Macedonians, the support to no change/double formula still remains (sum 76.4%) with a small growth of the support to the agreed name in international organisations (7.1% in 2010 to 15.1% in 2011). **The ethnic Albanians come closer to the views of the Macedonians**. There is a small increase of the support to no change (from 13.9% in 2010 to 19.8% in 2011), and a bigger increase of the double formula (from 15.8% in 2010 to 25.6% in 2011), or in total no change/double formula grew from 29.7% in 2010 to 45.4% in 2011. The previous increase is on the account of decreasing of the support to a new name for all usages (from 31.3% in 2010 to 12.3% in 2011).

Table 4 shows the views of the political party affiliates.

Table 4: Views on first best choice with political party affiliates

Most acceptable view	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
New name for all usages	4.0%	6.9%	13.8%	17.0%	6.8%
Agreed name for international usage	2.5%	1.0%	8.5%	8.5%	5.2%
Agreed name for the international organisations	12.5%	27.7%	31.9%	27.7%	16.8%
“The double formula”	16.0%	17.8%	26.6%	19.1%	22.2%
No change	63.5%	44.6%	17.0%	25.5%	46.6%
No answer	1.5%	2.0%	2.1%	2.1%	2.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Basically, the views of the political party affiliates follow the views of the citizens based on ethnic affiliation. The supporters of VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM and the citizens that have no political party affiliation decided for “no changes” as the first best choice that reflects their views. The support for an agreed name in the international organisations has grown with SDSM supporters (from 9.7% in 2010 to 27.7% in 2011), on the account of decreased support to the double formula and no change (from 53.5% in 2010 to 44.6% in 2011).

The case is similar when it comes to least acceptable solutions, presented below, where there are no significant changes from 2010.

Table 5: Views on the least acceptable choice with political party affiliates


Least acceptable view	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
New name for all usages	37.5%	34.7%	16.0%	25.5%	28.6%
Agreed name for international usage	17.5%	15.8%	23.4%	25.5%	19.9%
Agreed name for the international organisations	17.0%	21.8%	4.3%	12.8%	16.8%
“The double formula”	6.5%	6.9%	10.6%	12.8%	10.1%
No change	8.5%	8.9%	37.2%	19.1%	15.8%
Don’t know/No answer	13.0%	11.9%	8.5%	4.3%	8.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

III.2. Acceptability of Geographic Determinants

The citizens were asked about the acceptability of the geographic determinants, and these were the most frequently mentioned: northern, Vardar and upper, as well Skopje and central Balkan. The citizens were also asked about the position of the determinant in the possible name solution.

For most of the citizens (44.6%) none of the offered geographic determinants is acceptable, which is related to the view on no changes.

Graph 1: The most acceptable geographic determinant for achieving a mutually acceptable solution



With respect to the views the differences on ethnic and party basis are repeated as for the questions above.

Table 6: The most acceptable geographic determinant for achieving a mutually acceptable solution based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

	Total	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Northern	20.3%	16.5%	25.8%	14.3%	22.7%	24.3%	28.6%	19.5%
Upper	7.1%	6.2%	10.6%	4.8%	9.1%	9.7%	10.2%	6.0%
Vardar	7.4%	5.6%	12.5%	4.3%	10.0%	10.7%	14.3%	7.3%
Central Balkan	5.9%	3.8%	9.7%	4.8%	5.5%	7.8%	10.2%	5.9%
Skopje	10.2%	5.6%	21.0%	5.2%	3.6%	21.4%	22.4%	9.1%
None	44.6%	58.3%	14.3%	64.3%	45.5%	17.5%	14.3%	47.4%
DK/NA	4.5%	3.8%	6.1%	2.4%	3.6%	8.7%	0.0%	4.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The views on the position of the geographic determinant in the possible mutually acceptable solution are given below.

Graph 2: Most acceptable possibility for achieving a mutually acceptable solution




Table 7: The most acceptable variant for achieving a mutually acceptable solution based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation


	Total	et. Mac.	et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affiliation
None is acceptable	48.3%	60.0%	20.8%	66.0%	49.5%	21.3%	23.4%	50.1%
An adjective in front of the Republic of Macedonia, e.g. Northern Republic of Macedonia	17.4%	10.5%	32.1%	13.0%	17.8%	27.7%	38.3%	14.7%
An adjective after the Republic of Macedonia, e.g. Republic of Macedonia (Northern)	14.3%	15.1%	13.7%	8.5%	13.9%	17.0%	17.0%	15.4%
An adjective after Republic and in front of Macedonia, e.g. Republic of Northern Macedonia	14.3%	10.0%	23.9%	8.5%	11.9%	21.3%	19.1%	14.9%
DK/NA	5.7%	4.4%	9.6%	4.0%	6.9%	12.8%	2.1%	4.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

When it comes to the scope and usage of the geographic determinant for the possible mutual solution, the views for defining the nationality and language were surveyed.

III.3. Acceptability of (Additional) Defining the Nationality and Language

Graph 3 shows the view of the citizens on accepting the nationality/citizenship to be defined at the UN, for example, as “citizens of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”.

Graph 3: Would you accept that nationality/citizenship is defined in the UN as, for example, “citizens of the Republic Northern Macedonia”?




The big majority of citizens would not accept that the nationality/citizenship is defined in the UN as, for example, “citizens of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”.

There are differences on this issue between the ethnic Macedonians and Albanians.

Table 8: Acceptability of “citizens of the Republic Northern Macedonia” etc, defined as nationality/citizenship in the UN based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

	Total	Et. Mac.	Et. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Yes	22.9%	10.0%	52.2%	6.5%	15.8%	57.4%	44.7%	21.8%
No	69.4%	86.6%	29.0%	91.5%	81.2%	21.3%	46.8%	69.8%
DK/NA	7.7%	3.5%	18.8%	2.0%	3.0%	21.3%	8.5%	8.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Graph 4 shows the view of the citizens on accepting an additional defining the language in brackets, for example as Macedonian language (official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia).

Graph 4: Would you accept that the Macedonian language is additionally defined in brackets, for example, as “the official language of the Republic Northern Macedonia”?


The big majority of citizens do not accept additional defining of the language in brackets, for example, as Macedonian language (official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia), and this is the view of the big majority of the ethnic Macedonians and most of the ethnic Albanians.

Table 9: Acceptability of additional defining the language in brackets based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Yes	17.8%	8.3%	35.8%	5.5%	11.9%	41.5%	38.3%	16.6%
No	74.0%	87.0%	46.1%	91.5%	85.1%	37.2%	55.3%	74.9%
DK/NA	8.2%	4.7%	18.1%	3.0%	3.0%	21.3%	6.4%	8.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

An additional element of the possible mutually acceptable solution is the time of its taking effect, and the citizens are asked about their view, choosing between never, immediately and postponed for the moment of becoming an EU member. The views are shown in Graph 5.

III.4. Time of Possible Agreement Taking Effect

Graph 5: Most appropriate moment for the mutually accepted solution to take effect

Every forth citizen is for a postponed enforcement of the agreement, for the moment when we become an EU member, so that there are no new conditions. The ethnic differences repeat in the views.

Table 10: Most appropriate moment for the mutually accepted solution to take effect based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation


	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Never, a change of the name is not acceptable to me	37,8%	50,2%	11,3%	54,5%	42,6%	11,7%	12,8%	39,0%
Immediately after the agreement, regardless of NATO and EU integrations	31,6%	19,2%	59,0%	19,0%	25,7%	56,4%	53,2%	28,6%
Postponed, at the moment when we become n EU member and there are no new conditions	23,2%	23,9%	19,8%	21,0%	26,7%	16,0%	21,3%	25,3%
DK/NA	7,4%	6,6%	9,9%	5,5%	5,0%	16,0%	12,8%	7,1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

IV RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION

There was a further research on who is considered by the citizens responsible for a decision with respect to a mutually acceptable solution and what their expectations were regarding the decision of the International Court of Justice.

The citizens, asked who is responsible to resolve the dispute, i.e. who should make the decision if the differences are decreased, think that it is the citizens at a referendum.

Graph 6: Views of the citizens on who should make the decision on the name



The support of the referendum has increased (from 54.4% in 2010 to 64.0% in 2011). **The referendum is supported by all socio-demographic groups.**

Table 11: Views of the citizens on who should make the decision on the name on ethnic and party basis

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Citizens at a referendum	64.0%	69.4%	49.5%	75.0%	59.4%	53.2%	46.8%	63.6%
The government of the Republic of Macedonia	19.5%	18.5%	21.8%	14.0%	21.8%	24.5%	17.0%	21.0%
The President of the Republic of Macedonia in agreement with political party leaders	12.5%	8.3%	24.2%	8.0%	17.8%	17.0%	31.9%	10.6%
Don't know/No answer	3.9%	3.7%	4.4%	3.0%	1.0%	5.3%	4.3%	4.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


The support to the referendum **has increased among all ethnic groups**, and with the ethnic Albanians it has increased from 34.0% in 2010 to 49.5% in 2011.

V DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

At the International Court of Justice there has been a dispute between Macedonia and Greece on violating the Interim accord because the alleged veto for NATO membership. The Court is to make a decision soon.

Most of the citizens expect that Macedonia has a verdict to its own benefit.

Graph 7: Expectations on the decision of the International Court of Justice



This expectation is shared by all socio-demographic groups, 34.0% of the ethnic Albanians and 42.7% of the ethnic Albanians believe in a verdict favourable for Macedonia.


VI PRIORITIES AND REACTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE SOLUTION

The citizens were asked about their priorities regarding the name, timeframe of achieving the solution, their reaction to the possible solution, as well as their fears of the possible (non)solution.

The citizens were asked about their view when there is an equal importance of Macedonia (the name) and the Euro-Atlantic integrations (NATO, EU), what is more important for them, "to preserve the name even if it leads to a stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integrations and decrease the economic development" or "the Euro-Atlantic integrations (NATO, EU), to provide a perspective for the country, even if we have to accept a compromise with Greece, which does not endanger the Macedonian identity, culture and language".

The citizens are divided in their views on what is more important if it is equally important to keep the name and EU/NATO, with a certain number of citizens that disagree with both statements.

Graph 8: NATO/EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia



There are both ethnic and party differences on this issue.

Table 12: NATO/EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
EU and NATO are more important even if there is a compromise	40.5%	35.0%	53.2%	30.5%	40.6%	54.3%	63.8%	39.3%
Keeping the name even if there is a stand-still in the Euro-Atlantic integrations	39.6%	43.6%	31.1%	51.5%	34.7%	34.0%	27.7%	38.3%
I do not agree with any of the statements	16.1%	17.6%	11.6%	15.0%	17.8%	8.5%	4.3%	18.4%
I don't know/No answer	3.9%	3.9%	4.1%	3.0%	6.9%	3.2%	4.3%	4.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The name is more important for most of the ethnic Macedonians and affiliates of VMRO-DPMNE, while the Euro-Atlantic integrations are more important for most of the ethnic Albanians and affiliates of SDSM.

Among the citizens that stated that it is more important to keep the name, there are mostly citizens who opted for no change of the name when asked about solution (57.2%), as well as citizens who decided for the double formula and agreed name in the international organisations. Among the citizens who were for Euro-Atlantic integrations there are both citizens that were for the double formula (28.8%), no change (27.4%) and agreed name in the international organisations (27.4%).


Table 13: Crossing views on NATO/EU or keeping the name of the Republic of Macedonia with the most acceptable solution

Views	Keeping the name even if there is a stand-still	EU and NATO more important even if there is a compromise	I do not agree with any	DK/NA	Total
Agreed name for the international organ.	16.4%	26.3%	9.1%	14.3%	19.2%
“The double formula”	18.1%	28.8%	8.6%	16.7%	20.8%
No change	57.2%	27.4%	60.0%	50.0%	45.3%
New name for all usages	5.1%	10.2%	6.9%	7.1%	7.5%
Agreed name for international usage	1.4%	7.0%	9.7%	4.8%	5.1%
DK/NA	1.9%	.2%	5.7%	7.1%	2.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Graph 9 shows the answers of the citizens on the timeframe for resolving the dispute, i.e. the time that they think will be needed to resolve the dispute.

The majority of the citizens want a solution in a year (2011/2012), and a quarter (26.6%) for an indefinite time.

Graph 9: Personal wish and expectations on solution to the name dispute



There are no differences on ethnic or party affiliation.


On the other hand, the citizens expect a solution in two to five years (33.4%). Every fourth citizen thinks that there will be a solution in a year, but every fourth also thinks that the dispute will never be resolved. The ethnic Albanians are more optimistic than the ethnic Macedonians with respect to the timeframe.

Table 14: Expectations on solution to the name dispute based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affiliation
In a year	26.9%	20.2%	43.0%	22.5%	16.8%	47.9%	40.4%	25.1%
In two to five years	33.4%	35.7%	29.4%	38.0%	46.5%	28.7%	38.3%	31.5%
In six to ten years	15.5%	13.6%	17.1%	12.5%	14.9%	17.0%	12.8%	16.3%
Never	24.2%	30.6%	10.6%	27.0%	21.8%	6.4%	8.5%	27.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Graph 10 shows how the citizens would decide on a possible referendum.

Graph 10: Agreement at a referendum with: Change of the name into a Central Balkan Republic of Macedonia for overall international and bilateral usage?



The majority of the citizens (58.4%) would vote “no” at a referendum on a Central Balkan Republic of Macedonia for overall international and bilateral usage.

“No” would be the answer of a big majority (74.3%) of the ethnic Macedonians, as well as supporters of VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM.

Table 15: Agreement at a referendum with changing the name based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affiliation
Yes	19.5%	7.2%	48.8%	4.5%	16.8%	41.5%	51.1%	18.0%
No	58.4%	74.3%	19.1%	80.0%	69.3%	19.1%	29.8%	58.6%
I will not vote	22.0%	18.5%	32.1%	15.5%	13.9%	39.4%	19.1%	23.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 16 shows crossing views of the citizens that show that the majority of the citizens that decided for no change and double formula at the question on solution would vote “no” at a referendum, most that decided on an agreed name for international usage would vote “yes”, and most of the citizens that answered don’t know or no answer would not vote at a possible referendum.


Table 16: Crossing views: voting at the referendum with the most acceptable solution

View	Agreed name in international organisations	“Double formula”	No change	New name for all usages	Agreed name for international usage	DK/NA	Total
Yes	29.7%	26.4%	7.3%	40.2%	35.7%	9.1%	19.5%
No	39.2%	52.9%	74.1%	51.2%	30.4%	45.5%	58.4%
I will not vote	31.1%	20.7%	18.6%	8.5%	33.9%	45.5%	22.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Graph 11 shows the possible reactions of the citizens to the possible agreement supported by the big political parties and not having a referendum.

Most of the citizens (39.9%) would not participate in any activities.

Graph 11. If the big parties support the possible agreement and there is a referendum, would you participate in activities?




A total of 22% of the citizens would participate in protests against the possible agreement, and 6.6% of them would participate in self-organised civil violence.

Table 17: Participation in party activities on the referendum based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
I would not participate in any activities	39.9%	39.4%	41.3%	31.0%	51.5%	55.3%	31.9%	39.3%
So-so, depends on the agreement/ how much I am (dis)satisfied with the agreement	18.3%	20.1%	14.0%	23.5%	19.8%	12.8%	14.9%	17.9%
Self-organised protests AGAINST the agreement	15.4%	17.8%	10.2%	18.0%	6.9%	3.2%	17.0%	18.4%
Campaigns and peaceful rallies FOR the agreement	13.9%	9.5%	25.9%	14.0%	8.9%	21.3%	21.3%	12.5%
Self-organised civil violence (violent protests/attacks on institutions) to protect the name/prevent changing the name	6.6%	7.1%	4.4%	8.0%	6.9%	2.1%	6.4%	6.1%
Don't know/No answer	5.9 %	6.1%	4.1%	5.5%	5.9%	5.3%	8.5%	5.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Unless the dispute is resolved, 38.4% of the citizens think that there would be a stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integrations, and 31.7% that there would be an economic stand-still.

Graph 12: Main threats/risks if the dispute is not resolved

The views on the risks unless the dispute is resolved are shared on ethnic and party affiliation. It is important that the minority of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians think that the inter-ethnic relations would be deteriorated.

Table 18: Main threats/risks if the dispute is not resolved based on ethnic affiliation and political party affiliation

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
Stand-still in the Euro-Atlantic integrations (EU, NATO)	38.4%	36.4%	44.7%	33.5%	32.7%	52.1%	42.6%	38.5%
Economic stand-still	31.7%	32.2%	30.4%	34.0%	41.6%	27.7%	31.9%	31.0%
Deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations	13.8%	11.2%	17.7%	11.0%	10.9%	12.8%	19.1%	13.7%
No risks	8.5%	11.9%	1.4%	15.0%	8.9%	4.3%	2.1%	7.5%
Other	3.4%	4.0%	1.4%	2.0%	3.0%	2.1%	2.1%	4.2%
Don't know/No answer	4.2%	4.3%	4.4%	4.5%	3.0%	1.1%	2.1%	5.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The views on the main threats unless the dispute is resolved are shared by the citizens that have different views on resolving the dispute. Thus, the stand-still in the integrations is the main threat both for the citizens that are for no change and the others.

If the dispute is resolved, 40.4% of the citizens' fear from new demands of Greece until Macedonian identity is destroyed, and 20.1% fear of internal division.


Graph 13: Main threats/risks if the dispute is resolved with an agreement with Greece

Table 19: Main threats/risks if the dispute is resolved with an agreement with Greece based on ethnic affiliation and political party

View	Total	Eth. Mac.	Eth. Alb.	VMRO-DPMNE	SDSM	DUI	DPA	No party affil.
EU will not accept us because they do not want new members from the Balkans	6.8%	6.4%	7.8%	5.5%	11.9%	4.3%	8.5%	6.6%
There are no risks	15.5%	11.8%	25.9%	12.0%	11.9%	25.5%	23.4%	15.4%
There will be divisions, tensions and clashes between traitors and patriots	20.1%	21.7%	15.0%	24.0%	14.9%	16.0%	14.9%	21.0%
Greece will ask for new concessions on identity and language until it destroys the Macedonian identity	40.4%	45.6%	26.3%	44.5%	49.5%	22.3%	25.5%	41.8%
Other	6.5%	5.9%	8.5%	7.5%	2.0%	8.5%	17.0%	5.0%
I don't know/No answer	10.7%	8.6%	16.4%	6.5%	9.9%	23.4%	10.6%	10.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The citizens, for whom the most acceptable solution is no change, see the new concessions and division as the main threat if the dispute is resolved. The view of threat of new concessions is shared by most of the citizens.

Table 20: Crossing views: most acceptable solution with main threats if the dispute is resolved

Views	Agreed name in internat. organisations	“Double formula”	No change	New name for all usages	Agreed name for internat. usage	DK/NA	Total
New concessions	39.7%	34.4%	45.3%	37.8%	30.4%	31.8%	40.4%
EU will not accept us	6.7%	8.8%	5.7%	8.5%	7.1%	4.5%	6.8%
Divisions, tensions and clashes	18.7%	17.6%	22.9%	22.0%	14.3%	4.5%	20.1%
Other	9.6%	7.5%	5.1%	7.3%	5.4%		6.5%
No risks	18.2%	18.9%	11.7%	18.3%	17.9%	22.7%	15.5%
DK/NA	7.2%	12.8%	9.3%	6.1%	25.0%	36.4%	10.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

CONCLUSIONS

The citizens remain against any change of the name.

Almost half of the citizens are firmly against any change of the name, i.e. they opted for no change (45.3%) when asked about the possible solution; said they would not accept any determinant (44.6% and 48.3%), have the view to keep the name at the price of a stand-still (39.6%), and they would vote “no” at a possible referendum for a name for overall international usage (58.4%).

The majority that is for no change is bigger among the ethnic Macedonians (57% are for no change). The views have changed little since the December 2010 survey.

National unity around the name dispute

In 2010 there were differences on ethnic basis, without significant differences on party basis, and **in 2011 the ethnic differences are decreased**, i.e. the views are approximated in the direction that that solution is between no change and agreed name for the international organisations, with protection of identity and a decision at a referendum.

For the majority of the ethnic Macedonians (57%), the best solution is no change, while the views of the ethnic Albanians are more diverse, with the biggest support (38.3%) for an agreed name for the international organisations. With the ethnic Macedonians, the support to no change/double formula remains high (sum of 76.4%), with a small growth of the support to an agreed name in the international organisations (7.1% in 2010 to 15.1% in 2011). **The ethnic Albanians approximate the views of the ethnic Macedonians.** There is a small increase of the support to no change (13.9% in 2010 to 19.8% in 2011) and a bigger increase of the double formula (from 15.8% in 2010 to 25.6% in 2011), or in total no change/double formula has increased from 29.7% in 2010 to 45.4% in 2011. The increase is on the account of decreasing the support of the new name for all usages (from 31.3% in 2010 to 12.3% in 2011).

The citizens of **all ethnic and party affiliations** defend the **red line on the identity** (against additional definitions on the language) and ask for a decision on the name at a **referendum**.

Small window for compromise, probably after the announcement of the International Court of Justice decision, solution possible in mid- and long-term

He Euro-Atlantic integrations are important to 40.5% of the citizens and they think that a compromise with Greece should be accepted, such that would not endanger the Macedonian identity, culture and language. For these citizens, possible compromises are the “double formula” (20.8%) and agreed name for international organisations (19.2%).

Still, because of some **expectations of justice** in the International Court of Justice (36.9% of the citizens expect a decision for the benefit of Macedonia); it is difficult to assume that there would be a previous change of public opinion in the direction of bigger support to compromise.

The majority of the citizens (58%) want **a solution in a year**, but 26.9% expect it in a year, and most citizens **expect it in medium term** (two to five years – 33.4%), long term (six to ten years – 15.5%) or **never** (24.2%).

The possible model for an acceptable compromise, although with a minority support in the survey is “Northern Republic of Macedonia” or “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” as the agreed name for usage in the international organisations (UN, EU and NATO).

Identity as the granite red line

The majority of the citizens (69.4%) and a big majority of the ethnic Macedonians are against defining the nationality/citizenship in the UN, for example, as “citizens of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”.

A big majority (74%) of the citizens and ethnic Macedonians (87%) and most of the citizens of all ethnic affiliations are against additional defining of the language in the UN, for example, as Macedonian language (the official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia).

Consensus that the name would be decided at a referendum

The majority of the citizens (64%) of all ethnic and party affiliation ask for a decision on the name at a **referendum**. The support to the referendum has increased from December 2010 from 54.4% to 64%, including an increase of the support to the referendum among the ethnic Albanians from 34% in 2010 to 49.5% in 2011.

At the referendum against an agreed name for overall international usage, every fourth citizen would be involved in activities (protests) against the change of the name

The majority of the citizens (58.4%) would vote against the proposal Central Balkan Republic of Macedonia for overall international and bilateral usage.

Around 60% of the citizens could participate in activities around a possible referendum. If the big parties achieve an agreement, every fourth citizen would participate in activities against changing the name, at self-organised peaceful protests (15.4%) or civil violence (6.6%).

Fears of standstill, risk of new concessions and divisions – motives for and against the solution

The citizens fear threats and risks both in the case of not resolving and resolving the name dispute.

In case of not resolving it, the citizens fear a stand-still in the Euro-Atlantic integrations and economic stand-still.

However, the citizens also fear threats and risks in case the dispute is resolved, i.e. that Greece would demand new concessions with respect to identity and language until the Macedonian identity is destroyed (40.4%), and that there would be a division to traitors and patriots (21.7%). These two threats are threats for the survival of the nation and they are probably the **main motive in refusing a compromise**. Both fears are based on previous experience. Three times until now (1991/92, 1994/95 and 2008) Greece used trade and political blockages to put pressure for changing the Constitution, flag, etc.

Both fears can be overcome with certain solutions

Both fears of new concessions and divisions can be overcome.

On the fear of new demands by Greece, because it is hard to expect that Greece directly recognises the Macedonian nation (identity, culture and language), the possible solution is the proposal of Gerald Knaus from the European Stability Initiative (ESI). The solution is the possible agreement between Greece and Macedonia takes effect on the day Macedonia becomes an EU member (it would join NATO under the temporary reference). In this way, Greece would become a promoter of the Macedonian membership rather than its obstacle and Macedonia would know that there would be no new barriers to its road to the EU, regardless if they are put by Greece or countries that oppose the expansion (possible referendum in France of vetoes from countries where there is an influence of the extreme right parties).

The second fear of division can be overcome by using a “Framework model”, i.e. that the possible agreement with Greece is approved in writing by all main political parties.

ANNEX 1. QUESTIONNAIRE

Q1. I will read you some statements that are heard in the public on solving the name issue.

- 1.1. Please choose the statement that best reflects your view.
- 1.2. Please choose the second statement that best reflects your view.
- 1.3 Please choose the statement that least reflects your view.

Statements:

1. The solution to the name dispute is usage of an agreed name only in the international organisations (UN, NATO, EU, etc), while the countries would address us upon their own choice and agreement in the bilateral relations (agreed name in the international organisations).].
2. The solution to the dispute is the usage of the name Republic of Macedonia in internal and international communication, and Greece can use another name ("the double formula").
3. Macedonia should not accept any change (no change).
4. The solution to the dispute is accepting a new constitutional name for all usages (new name for all usages "erga omnes").
5. The solution to the name dispute is the usage of an agreed name for the overall international and bilateral usage, while the Republic of Macedonia would be for internal usage only (agreed name for overall international usage).
6. I don't know/I have no answer

Q2. Which adjective/addition would be the most acceptable to achieve a mutually acceptable solution (two answers)?

- | | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Northern | 2. Upper | 3. Vardar | 4. Central Balkan |
| 5. Skopje | 6. None is acceptable | 7. I don't know/I have no answer | |

Q3. Which variant would be most acceptable to achieve a mutually acceptable solution?

1. An adjective in front of Republic of Macedonia, for example, the Northern Republic of Macedonia
2. An adjective after Republic, and before Macedonia, for example the Republic of Northern Macedonia
3. An adjective after the Republic of Macedonia, for example the Republic of Macedonia (Northern)
4. None is acceptable
5. I don't know/I have no answer

Q4. When is it most appropriate for the mutually acceptable solution to take effect?

1. Immediately after the agreement, regardless of NATO and EU integrations
2. Postponed, at the moment we become an EU member, so that there are no new conditions
3. Never, the change of the name is not acceptable to me
4. I don't know/I have no answer

Q5. Would you accept that the nationality/citizenship at the UN is defined, for example, as "citizens of the Republic of Northern Macedonia"?

- | | | |
|--------|-------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Yes | 2. No | 3. I don't know/I have no answer |
|--------|-------|----------------------------------|

Q6. Would you accept that the Macedonian language is additionally defined in brackets, for example, as the "official language of the Republic of Northern Macedonia"?

- | | | |
|--------|-------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Yes | 2. No | 3. I don't know/I have no answer |
|--------|-------|----------------------------------|

Q7. Who should decide on the possible agreement?

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. The Government of Macedonia | 2. The President of the Republic of Macedonia in agreement with the main political parties |
| 3. The citizens at a referendum | |

Q8. There is a case between Macedonia and Greece at the International Court of Justice on violating the Interim accord due to the veto for joining NATO. The Court is to reach a verdict soon. What are your expectations on the verdict?

1. Macedonia will have a favourable verdict, that Greece has violated the Interim accord
2. Greece will have a favourable verdict, that there was no veto at the NATO summit
3. The verdict will be that both Macedonia and Greece have violated the Interim accord
4. The court will not reach a verdict or it will be unclear
5. I don't know, I haven't heard about the trial/I have no answer

Q9. Which of these two statements is the closest to your own view/conviction?

1. Of course, both Macedonia (the name) and the Euro-Atlantic integrations (NATO, EU) are important. However, if I am to choose between the two of them, I would consider keeping the name more important on the cost that it leads to a stand-still of the Euro-Atlantic integrations and decreases the economic growth.
2. Of course, both Macedonia (the name) and the Euro-Atlantic integrations (NATO, EU) are important. However, if I am to choose between the two of them, I would consider the Euro-Atlantic integrations (NATO, EU) more important, to provide a perspective for the country, even if we are to accept a compromise with Greece, which does not endanger the Macedonian identity, culture and language.
3. I do not agree with any or the given statements (spontaneously).
4. I don't know/I have no answer (spontaneously).

Q10. For how long would you personally want the name dispute to be resolved?

1. In one year 2. 2-5 years 3. Unidentified, as long as it takes for a reasonable agreement
4. I don't know/I have no answer

Q11. How long do you think it will take to resolve the name dispute?

1. One year 2. 2-5 years 3. 6-10 years 4. Never

Q12. At a referendum where the following question has been asked (card), how would you vote: "I agree with the change of the name into Central Balkan Republic of Macedonia, for overall international and bilateral use"?

1. Yes 2. No 3. I will not vote

Q13. If the big parties support the possible agreement and there is a referendum, would you participate in?

1. Campaigns and peaceful rallies to support the agreement with Greece and vote at the referendum FOR the agreement
2. Self-organised protests and other peaceful ways in which keeping the name would be supported and voting at the referendum AGAINST the agreement
3. Self-organised civil violence (violent protests/attacks on institutions) to defend the name/prevent changing the name
4. So-so – depends on what has been agreed/how satisfied I am with the agreement
5. I would not participate in any activities 6. I don't know/I have no answer

Q14. What are the main threats/risks if the dispute is not resolved?

1. Stand-still in the Euro-Atlantic integrations (EU/NATO) 2. Deterioration of inter-ethnic relations
3. Economic stand-still 4. Other
5. There are no risks 6. I don't know/I have no answer

Q15. Will there be risks if the name dispute with Greece is resolved?

1. Greece will ask for new concessions on identity and language until it destroys the Macedonian identity
2. EU will not accept us because they do not want new members from the Balkans
3. There will be divisions, tensions and clashes of traitors and patriots
4. Other 5. There are no risks 6. I don't know/I have no answer

ANNEX 2. SAMPLE STRUCTURE

The sample covered 1,090 people surveyed. The sample population frame was population older than 15, and the representativeness criteria were: gender, age, ethnic affiliation, place of living and regions.

Gender	%
Man	55.2
Woman	44.8
Age	%
15-29	29.5
30-44	30.3
45-59	23.4
More than 60	16.8
Ethnic affiliation	%
Macedonian	66.3
Albanian	26.9
Turkish	1.9
Roma	1.6
Serb	1.3
Vlach	0.8
Bosniak	0.2
Other	1.0
Religious affiliation	%
Christian Orthodox	66.7
Moslem	30.3
Catholic	0.5
Other	0.3
Atheist/Agnostic/Secular/No answer	2.3
Place of living	%
Village	37.8
Town	14.7
City	26.4
Skopje	21.1
Education	%
No formal education	0.5
Incomplete primary school	3.5
Primary education	12.1
High school education	50.6
College	8.2
University	22.4
Graduate studies	2.8

Employment status	%
Unemployed	30.6
Pensioner	6.0
Professional worker	12.8
Manager, director or officer	3.1
Company owner	6.3
Clerk	8.4
Salesperson	5.4
Service work	5.0
Construction worker or miner	2.6
Production worker	6.1
Transport worker	2.1
Installation or repairman	1.1
Farmer, fisherman	2.8
Other	7.6
No answer	0.1
Which political party do you support (spontaneously)?	%
VMRO-DPMNE	18.3
SDSM	9.3
DUI	8.6
DPA	4.3
Other	6.5
None	52.9
Region	%
Skopje	28.4
Southeast	8.3
East	10.1
Northeast	8.3
Vardar	7.3
Southwest	10.1
Polog	15.6
Pelagonija	11.9